



JPRS Report—

Arms Control

2013-05-15 10:54:51.000000000 +0000

19990114 113

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-91-026

CONTENTS

12 November 1991

CHINA

U.S. Launches 'Star Wars' Experiment Rocket <i>[XINHUA 14 Oct]</i>	1
North, South Korea To Discuss Nuclear-Free Zone	1
Southern Premier Cited <i>[XINHUA 14 Oct]</i>	1
Foreign Ministry Backs NFZ <i>[XINHUA 17 Oct]</i>	1
U.S. Takes New Approach in Space Defense Talks <i>[XINHUA 15 Oct]</i>	1
U.S. Said Helping Russia Build Missile Shield <i>[XINHUA 15 Oct]</i>	2
Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative Assessed <i>[XINHUA 18 Oct]</i>	2

EAST ASIA

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Reaction to French Nuclear Test Cuts 'Mixed' <i>[AFP 11 Oct]</i>	4
--	---

INDONESIA

UN Envoy Urges New Strategy To Stop Arms Race <i>[Jakarta Radio 17 Oct]</i>	4
---	---

JAPAN

Government To Urge PRC, India To Reduce Arms <i>[KYODO 15 Oct]</i>	4
UN Envoy Seeks Arms Transfer Reporting System <i>[KYODO 16 Oct]</i>	4

NORTH KOREA

Withdrawal of All U.S. Nuclear Weapons Urged <i>[Pyongyang Radio 8 Oct]</i>	5
Demand for Withdrawal of Nuclear Arms From South <i>[KCNA 16 Oct]</i>	7
Groups Demand Pullout of U.S. Nuclear Weapons	7
Youth League Statement <i>[KCNA 18 Oct]</i>	7
Peace Committee Statement <i>[KCNA 20 Oct]</i>	8
Agricultural Union Statement <i>[KCNA 19 Oct]</i>	8
Newspaper Article <i>[KCNA 20 Oct]</i>	8

SOUTH KOREA

Talks on U.S. Nuclear Arms Withdrawal Scheduled <i>[YONHAP 4 Oct]</i>	9
North-South Talks on Nuclear Issues, Arms Cuts Proposed <i>[YONHAP 10 Oct]</i>	9
Organizations Seek Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons <i>[YONHAP 14 Oct]</i>	10
Officials on Reports of U.S. Nuclear Arms Pullout	10
Ministry Refuses To Confirm Report <i>[YONHAP 20 Oct]</i>	10
Official: 'No Knowledge' <i>[YONHAP 21 Oct]</i>	10
Nuclear Umbrella To Remain <i>[YONHAP 19 Oct]</i>	11

NEW ZEALAND

Cabinet To Review Ban on Nuclear-Powered Ships <i>[AFP 14 Oct]</i>	11
Former Prime Minister Lange Hits New Ships-Calls Policy <i>[AFP 16 Oct]</i>	11

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Foreign Minister Urges End to French Nuclear Tests <i>[AFP 10 Oct]</i>	11
--	----

VIETNAM

Foreign Minister Welcomes Bush, Gorbachev Initiatives *[Hanoi Radio 9 Oct]* 12

EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

U.S.-German Statement on European Security Welcomed *[BTA 17 Oct]* 13

POLAND

Deputy Defense Minister at CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar *[PAP 8 Oct]* 13

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Official on Ratification of Tlatelolco Treaty *[TELAM 20 Oct]* 14

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Foreign Office Statement on Bush Initiative *[THE HINDU 1 Oct]* 15
Bush Initiative Term 'Long Overdue' *[C. Raja Mohan; THE HINDU 1 Oct]* 15
Call for Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons *[Delhi Radio 18 Oct]* 17

SOVIET UNION

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Arms Elimination Procedures, Costs Urged *[A. Golts; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Oct]* 18
Bush Said Concerned Over 'Interethnic Conflicts' in USSR *[V. Bogachev; TASS 10 Oct]* 18
Military Leaders Assess Bush, Gorbachev Initiatives 19
Chief of Staff Comments *[V. Lobov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Oct]* 19
Defense Minister Lauds 'Disarmament Race' *[Radio Rossii 12 Oct]* 20
Officer Warns Against Arms Cuts 'Euphoria' *[D. Belskiy; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 11 Oct]* 20
U.S. Reaction to 'Disarmament Race' Viewed *[V. Kobysh, B. Kalyagin; Moscow TV 13 Oct]* 22
Russian Foreign Ministry Backs 'More Radical' Proposals *[IZVESTIYA 10 Oct]* 23
Moves on Strategic, Tactical Nuclear Arms, SDI Assessed
[V. Chernyshev; Moscow Radio 13 Oct] 23
Deputy Foreign Minister on Bartholomew Discussions *[A. Obukhov; Moscow TV 15 Oct]* 25
World Reaction to Bush, Gorbachev Proposals Viewed *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 8 Oct]* 26

GENERAL

Discussion of Russian Republic's Nuclear Arms Role 27
Gorbachev-Yeltsin Agreement *[Berlin ADN 13 Oct]* 27
Russia To Have Equal Say *[Moscow TV 15 Oct]* 27
Public Opinion Poll *[INTERFAX 18 Oct]* 27
Strategic Studies Institute Created *[A. Portanskiy, I. Surkov; IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 27
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lobov Interviewed *[PRAVDA 17 Oct]* 28
Reaction to German Plan To Deploy Nuclear Arms *[V. Bogachev; TASS 15 Oct]* 30

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

RSFSR Officials View ABM Cooperation With U.S. 31
Deputy Defense Chief: 'Very Interesting Proposal' *[V. Shlykov; TASS 15 Sept]* 31
Defense Chief: No Discussion Yet *[K. Kobets; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Oct]* 31
U.S. Calls for ABM Cooperation Viewed *[V. Bogachev; TASS 16 Oct]* 32

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Resistance to Pressure for Withdrawal From Baltic States	32
Defense Ministry Official Comments [<i>Moscow Radio 11 Oct</i>]	32
Ministries Against 'Speedy' Pullout [<i>M. Mayorov, I. Porshnev; INTERFAX 10 Oct</i>]	33
Housing Problems Stressed [<i>V. Izgarshev; PRAVDA 9 Oct</i>]	33
'Ultimatums' in CSCE Viewed [<i>V. Shmyganskiy; IZVESTIYA 17 Oct</i>]	34
Lithuanian-Soviet Discussion of Troop Withdrawal Continues	34
Landsbergis Confirms Stance [<i>BALTFAX 10 Oct</i>]	34
Lithuanian Vice Premier Assesses Pullout [<i>Z. Vaisvila; Radio Vilnius 8 Oct</i>]	34
Further on 1994 Timetable [<i>V. Litovkin; IZVESTIYA 9 Oct</i>]	35
Landsbergis Repeats Call For Pullout [<i>BALTFAX 11 Oct</i>]	36
Soviet Commander Views Withdrawal Demands [<i>Ye. Podkolzin; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 12 Oct</i>]	36
Airborne Division Writes to Landsbergis [<i>TASS 11 Oct</i>]	36
Moscow Blamed for Delays [<i>BALTFAX 12 Oct</i>]	37
Commentary Cites Lithuanian Defense Minister [<i>R. Pakeniene; Vilnius International 12 Oct</i>]	37
Latvia, Moscow Agree on Troop Pullout From Riga	38
Moscow Radio Report [<i>10 Oct</i>]	38
Riga Radio Report [<i>10 Oct</i>]	38
Foreign Ministry Spokesman: Troop Withdrawal From Poland Set [<i>TASS 10 Oct</i>]	38
Reports on CSCE Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar	39
First Deputy Chief of Staff Omelichev Speaks [<i>TASS 10 Oct</i>]	39
Further on Omelichev Speech [<i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Oct</i>]	40
General Staff's Markovskiy Details Forces Cuts [<i>TASS 11 Oct</i>]	41
Further on Markovskiy Speech [<i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Oct</i>]	42
Less Need for Large Exercises Seen [<i>V. Smelov; TASS 17 Oct</i>]	43
Observer Comments on Troop Withdrawals From East Europe [<i>V. Solovyev; Moscow International 11 Oct</i>]	43
U.S. Military Inspectors Visit Severodvinsk [<i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 12 Oct</i>]	43
Lithuanian Envoy Discusses European Arms Forum [<i>BALTFAX 17 Oct</i>]	44
U.S. Seeks Information on Soviet Forces in Estonia [<i>BALTFAX 17 Oct</i>]	44
Progress on Personnel Cuts Agreement in CFE Talks [<i>TASS 17 Oct</i>]	44

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Envoy to PRC: Arms To Remain in Far East [<i>Tokyo KYODO 15 Oct</i>]	44
--	----

NUCLEAR TESTING

Commentary Justifies Nuclear Testing Moratorium [<i>S. Kozlov; Moscow Radio 13 Oct</i>]	45
Peace Committee Urges End to Novaya Zemlya Tests [<i>TASS 14 Oct</i>]	45

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

U.S. Preparations To Destroy Chemical Weapons Assessed [<i>N. Akimov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Sep</i>]	45
Envoy to CD Discusses CW Committee Session [<i>TASS 11 Oct</i>]	46

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

PRAVDA on Korean Nuclear-Free Zone [<i>V. Ovchinnikov; 7 Oct</i>]	47
Ukraine Demands Nuclear Withdrawal by 1995 [<i>Paris AFP 11 Oct</i>]	47
DPRK Envoy on U.S. Nuclear Withdrawal From Korea [<i>Moscow International 16 Oct</i>]	48

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Military Forces in Kurils To Be Reduced [<i>Paris AFP 14 Oct</i>]	48
---	----

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

'Adequate Level' Nuclear Arms To Be Maintained <i>[LE MONDE 10 Oct]</i>	49
Defense Minister on UK, French Nuclear Status <i>[P. Joxe; London TV 14 Oct]</i>	49

GERMANY

Defense Minister Announces Military Personnel Cuts <i>[FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 12 Oct]</i>	50
Defense Minister on NATO Nuclear Arms Reduction Plans	50
'Minimum Stock' Said 'Indispensible' <i>[DPA 14 Oct]</i>	50
Further Report <i>[DIE WELT 16 Oct]</i>	50
Defense Ministry Denies Cuts in Bundeswehr Below 370,000 Men <i>[ADN 17 Oct]</i>	51

SWEDEN

Possible Changes in Disarmament Body Previewed <i>[SVENSKA DAGBLADET 15 Oct]</i>	51
--	----

TURKEY

Chief of Staff: Agree With USSR on Tactical Nuclear Arms <i>[ANATOLIA 10 Oct]</i>	52
Soviet Envoy Voices Concern Over Nuclear Weapons <i>[ANATOLIA 10 Oct]</i>	52

UNITED KINGDOM

Bush Arms Cuts Supported, Trident Unaffected <i>[THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 28 Sep]</i>	52
--	----

U.S. Launches 'Star Wars' Experiment Rocket

*OW1410192891 Beijing XINHUA in English
1546 GMT 14 Oct 91*

[Text] Washington, October 14 (XINHUA)—A small rocket carrying star wars experiments for the Department of Defense was launched early this morning, according to local reports.

The 29-foot solid-propellant rocket Aries, code-named "Red Tigress 2", blasted off from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station at 6:17 AM, reaching an altitude of about 240 miles during its nine-minute flight before falling into the Atlantic Ocean, 93 miles downrange, as planned.

Another single-stage, rail-launched Aries, "Red Tigress 1", carrying identical experiments, veered sharply off course right after the launch on August 20. However, Air Force controllers issued self-destruct commands 23 seconds into the flight when the rocket was only 1.5 miles high.

This morning's flight of the second Aries had been canceled twice before, the last time on September 2 due to the failure of a unit that monitors the rocket's in-flight performance and relays the information to the ground.

Officials from the Strategic Defense Initiative organization declined to discuss the experiments aboard today's nine-minute flight.

But civilian space analysts said they believe infrared sensors on the ground and aircraft were tracking the rocket to test its ability to distinguish between enemy missiles and harmless decoys.

North, South Korea To Discuss Nuclear-Free Zone

Southern Premier Cited

*OW1410212491 Beijing XINHUA in English
1621 GMT 14 Oct 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, October 14 (XINHUA)—South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Choe Ho-chung said that the fourth round of premiers' talks between the two sides of Korea to be held in Pyongyang next Tuesday will focus on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] in the Korean peninsula proposed by the North.

Choe, who is also the minister of National Unification Board, made the remark today at a meeting on peaceful reunification held in Seoul.

He said that the peace issue of the Korean peninsula will be eventually resolved by the two sides themselves through consultation.

The signing of a mutual non-aggression declaration, he added, depends on the removal of mistrust and military confrontation between the two sides.

Foreign Ministry Backs NFZ

*OW1710091591 Beijing XINHUA in English
0852 GMT 17 Oct 91*

[Text] Beijing, October 17 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman today said that China supports turning the Korean peninsular into a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] and the feasible steps to realize this goal.

At a weekly press conference here this afternoon, spokesman Wu Jianmin was asked whether "North Korea's accepting international supervision on its nuclear installations" was discussed during the recent China visit by President Kim Il-song of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). "During President Kim Il-song's visit, the two sides touched upon the question and the DPRK side reiterated its position on this issue, hoping that the United States will withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea," he said.

The Chinese side expressed the hope that the parties concerned will solve this problem through consultations, he said.

"China supports the stand for turning the Korean peninsular into a nuclear-free zone and all the feasible steps taken to realize this above-mentioned goal," Wu said.

U.S. Takes New Approach in Space Defense Talks

*OW1610015191 Beijing XINHUA in English
2202 GMT 15 Oct 91*

[Text] Washington, Octobeer 15 (XINHUA)—The Bush Administration, determined to put a strategic anti-ballistic missile system in place, today announced a new approach to the space defense negotiations with the Soviet Union.

"The United States is now prepared to discuss limits on the scope and timing of defense deployments, consistent with the President's direction to pursue a system providing global protection against limited strikes (GPALS)," White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said in a statement.

Previously, the United States sought unlimited deployments of space defense systems and the softening of the U.S. position was apparently designed to make it easier for the Soviets to accept its requirement for deploying GPALS, a scaled-down version of "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

On September 27, while announcing a nuclear arms reduction initiative, U.S. President George Bush called on the Soviets to permit the GPALS deployment and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded with proposals for further talks on the issue and a joint early warning system against missile attack.

The U.S. deployment of large-scale anti-ballistic missile [ABM] system will require an agreement with the Soviet

Union or an amendment to the 1972 U.S.-Soviet anti-ballistic missile treaty which allows ABM protection for one place each.

Fitzwater said that the new position, which will be taken up by U.S. delegates to existing negotiations in Geneva, "builds on the climate reflected by the President's nuclear initiative and the positive Soviet response."

It "should make it possible to reach an agreement facilitating the deployment of ballistic missile defenses to protect against accidental, unauthorized or third country launches," he said.

Fitzwater's statement also called on the Congress to support the new SDI program, saying that "as we pursue an agreement in Geneva, it is essential for Congress to do its part by supporting our efforts there and by funding the strategic defense initiative at a level that will enable us to deploy ballistic missile defenses at the earliest point feasible."

U.S. Said Helping Russia Build Missile Shield

*OW1510115791 Beijing XINHUA in English
1100 GMT 15 Oct 91*

[Text] London, October 15 (XINHUA)—The United States is helping the Russians to develop defenses to protect Soviet territory against missiles launched, accidentally or on purpose, by any of the republics, a leading British newspaper reported today.

THE INDEPENDENT quoted a senior Russian Federation official as saying Monday that contrary to what President Mikhail Gorbachev has said, Soviet nuclear weapons outside Russia are not under firm central control.

"Two weeks ago, President George Bush proposed working with the Soviet Union on such a system, of a type known as 'global protection against limited strikes' (GPALS), but it was not widely known that U.S.-Russian-Soviet cooperation had gone so far," the paper said.

According to THE INDEPENDENT, the purpose of the proposed system would be to provide defenses against nuclear weapons remaining in the hands of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Such a system could also protect against ballistic missiles launched from neighboring countries which were developing nuclear weapons.

"It is understood that the agreement would involve limited technology transfer and not, for example, the sale of any U.S. missiles to the Soviet Union," it said.

The paper said that the U.S.-Russian deal was disclosed by Vitaliy Shlykov, deputy defence minister of the Russian Federation, yesterday on his return from a high-level military mission to Washington.

"During our talks with U.S. defence chiefs we reached conclusions at expert level which will now be examined at higher political level. One of the most effective means of coping with the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons among the republics is collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States," he told an international conference in Rimini, Italy.

Shlykov said that the discussions in Washington focused on an area defense covering the whole of the Soviet Union. The system would need to be capable of intercepting up to 200 missiles of various kinds. It would be a "global" system which would permit the deployment also of local anti-missile defenses at sea and surface levels.

He said that the scheme had the approval of military chiefs from both the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union.

Shlykov added that the proposed cooperation should not be seen as a step towards a condominium between the United States and the Soviet Union in the strategic field.

"We see the future development of Soviet armed forces as part of a global defence system," he said, adding that the deployment of anti-missile systems would take place in the context of further deep reductions in the numbers of offensive warheads on both sides.

Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative Assessed

*OW1810140391 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0808 GMT 18 Oct 91*

[“LIAOWANG” article: “Why Does the Soviet Union Promptly Respond To the U.S. Nuclear Disarmament Proposal?”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, 18 Oct (XINHUA)—The 42d issue of “LIAOWANG” [OUTLOOK] Weekly, which will be released on 21 October, carries an article analyzing the reason for the Soviet Union's prompt response to the U.S. nuclear disarmament proposal.

The article says: On the evening of 5 October, Soviet President Gorbachev delivered a statement through the Central Television Station, announcing that the Soviet Union would adopt seven “corresponding steps” toward a new proposal on nuclear disarmament put forward by U.S. President Bush on 27 September. Gorbachev's statement on adopting “corresponding steps” was made only one week after Bush put forward the new proposal on nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union's response was quite fast. Judging from the Soviet proposal, the scope of nuclear disarmament and the quantities for certain nuclear weapons to be reduced exceed even the U.S. demands upon the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did this for a number of reasons.

The article says: “First of all, tactical nuclear weapons are short-range, with a general range within 200 kilometers. They can only be used in one's own country or allied

countries. Therefore, people long ago described tactical nuclear weapons like nuclear guns as 'military surplus' from the 'cold war' period. In the wake of the Soviet Union's withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, the situation has now fundamentally changed. It is more apparent that tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the European continent are unnecessary. There have long been controversies as to the use of such weapons at sea. Some military theorists hold that the employment of such weapons could lead to the 'suicide' of a fleet.

"Judging from the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons, there is no way to control strictly such weapons. The Soviet Union now has about 15,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear warheads, scattered in various regions. It is very difficult to guarantee that those weapons will not fall into the hands of local leaders. Under the present unstable political situation and the intensification of contradictions between the peoples of various nationalities in the Soviet Union, this is a great hidden problem. The West is quite worried about the matter. Not long ago, when U.S. Secretary of State Baker visited Moscow, he repeatedly mentioned the primary U.S. concern on the fate of nuclear arsenals within Soviet territories. It was precisely with this background that Bush asked the Soviet Union to dismantle and destroy all land based tactical nuclear weapons, including the aforementioned nuclear artillery shells and tactical missile warheads. Moscow also has such worries, like Washington, and is willing to destroy such weapons to eliminate a cause of future trouble. The two sides happen to

hold the same view on this issue, being different in approach but equally satisfactory in result.

"As to strategic nuclear weapons, both the Soviet Union and the United States have more than enough. According to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed not long ago, the two sides only reduced to one-third their strategic nuclear weapons—there is still a very great potential for further reduction by the two countries. In addition, some people in the West hold that four nuclear powers may emerge within the Soviet Union, namely the Russian Republic, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan. We still do not know whether Moscow will use this opportunity to retire tactical nuclear weapons from the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. If so, this will be in accord with Moscow's attempt to have control of the launch buttons in its own hand."

The article says: Moreover, the maintenance of a large arsenal of weapons and upkeep on a large number of troops will be very expensive. The Soviet Union is in a state of economic crisis and wants to save money through massive arms reductions, so it can then use the money to solve its domestic problems. Finally, following the incident in August, Gorbachev's prestige has decreased. This is unfavorable to his efforts to maintain his presidential position. Bush's present proposal is a good opportunity for Gorbachev to retrieve himself from an inferior position. Gorbachev once again wanted to attract domestic and foreign attention to himself.

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Reaction to French Nuclear Test Cuts 'Mixed'

BK1210115591 Hong Kong AFP in English 1125 GMT 11 Oct 91

[Text] Papeete, Oct 12 (AFP)—French Polynesia has mixed feelings about France's announcement of a reduction in its South Pacific nuclear tests from six to four in 1992.

Combined with the Soviet proposal for a complete worldwide halt for all such tests, the French territory is pondering its future, especially as the Pacific Experimental Centre (CEP) has played a substantial economic role here for 25 years.

Gaston Flosse, head of French Polynesia's government, said he naturally approved of the reasoning behind the French decision, because of the "significant movements towards disarmament being undertaken by the superpowers."

However, he added, "it is important that France maintains a defence potential compatible with its expected world role to safe guard its vital interests and those of others for which it is responsible."

"With its French associations, Polynesia expresses the wish that a positive decision in terms of international relations will not result in unfavourable economic and financial consequences for French Polynesia."

Local legislator Alexandre Leontieff said: "French Polynesia risks suffering economic, financial and social consequences from global disarmament."

"I am in favour of comprehensive agreements for 10 or 15 years between the (French) government and the territory which propose and integrate joint action in productive sectors such as tourism, the sea, farm-produce, renewable energy resources, education and professional training, as well as for the necessary equipment to open up the remote archipelagos."

Emile Vernaudon, president of the territory's assembly, said: "It is certain these recent international events will have repercussions ... in French Polynesia."

INDONESIA

UN Envoy Urges New Strategy To Stop Arms Race

BK1810114691 Jakarta Radio Republik Indonesia Network in Indonesian 1500 GMT 17 Oct 91

[Text] Indonesia has called for the creation of a more comprehensive strategy to stop the arms race and promote disarmament. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York today, Nana Sutresna, Indonesian permanent representative to the United Nations,

said piecemeal efforts, especially those aimed at curbing nuclear arms race, have proven to be inadequate.

He said that, despite significant progress in the international political and security situation, the arms race, especially in terms of quality, still continues. Global military spending has been reduced—but not in a dramatic way—and arms trade continues unabated. Nana Sutresna stressed that what is needed now is a new integrated approach that includes arms reduction and disarmament.

JAPAN

Government To Urge PRC, India To Reduce Arms

OW1510133591 Tokyo KYODO in English 1321 GMT 15 Oct 91

[Text] Bangkok, Oct. 15 (KYODO)—Japan will tell China and India, two of Asia's military powers, of the need for reduction in arms spending in negotiating official economic assistance, a senior Japanese Government official said Tuesday.

"We cannot simply make our aid conditional on military spending cuts but we'd like to convey such an idea through negotiations," Vice Finance Minister for International Affairs Tadao Chino told a news conference.

Military policy constitutes part of a nation's sovereignty and cannot be linked with assistance, Chino said.

"But we intend to make judgments, bearing it (the two nations being military powers) in mind, and monitor developments in the process of disbursing aid," he added.

Japan is a leading aid donor for China and India.

Chino is a member of the Japanese delegation to the current joint annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank under way in Bangkok.

IMF and World Bank leaders have repeatedly stressed the need to reduce defense spending, taking advantage of the end of the cold war, and meet a looming global credit shortage.

UN Envoy Seeks Arms Transfer Reporting System

OW1610034291 Tokyo KYODO in English 0131 GMT 16 Oct 91

[Text] New York, Oct. 15 (KYODO)—Japan urged the United Nations on Tuesday to establish a reporting system on international arms transfers within the world body as soon as possible.

Mitsuro Donowaki, Japanese ambassador to the conference on disarmament in Geneva, said in a session of the committee on disarmament of the U.N. General

Assembly that the Gulf crisis was an example of aggression brought about by international arms transfers.

"One of the lessons to be learned from the Gulf crisis is that the amassing of massive arsenals by one country through international transfer and proliferation contributes to aggressive behavior when such actions are tied to that country's political aim," he said.

The U.N. reporting system for increased transparency in international conventional arms trading was first proposed by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu at an international disarmament meeting in Kyoto in May.

Japan and the 12 European Community member nations are preparing to jointly submit a resolution on the establishment of the system to the on-going U.N. General Assembly session.

Donowaki said in his speech that this type of registration system should not be expected to be perfect from the beginning, but rather should be established as early as possible and improved upon later to gradually become a "universal and non-discriminatory" system.

The ambassador also said that questions remain over the adequacy of the system, concerning whether it should include indigenous arms production and the transfer of components and related arms technology.

"In particular, those nations which depend on arms imports rather than on indigenous production are afraid that enhanced transparency of arms transfers might endanger their national security," he said.

He said that although transparency must also be promoted in arms production and arms components, the volume of information to be reported will increase tremendously if the system includes those areas.

"Therefore, a realistic way would be to begin with what is immediately feasible, while at the same time to keep studying ways to expand the register to cover production and components."

He also said Japan strongly calls upon "any country which, while being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has not yet concluded a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to do so without further delay."

NORTH KOREA

Withdrawal of All U.S. Nuclear Weapons Urged
SK1110045691 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0121 GMT 8 Oct 91

[NODONG SINMUN 8 October commentator's article:
"Nuclear Threat Must Be Removed"]

[Text] Today the important issue for global peace is to realize nuclear disarmament.

On 27 September, U.S. President Bush stated that the United States would take measures to unilaterally withdraw short-range nuclear weapons from ground and sea bases and fundamentally remove them.

We have consistently maintained that the testing and production of nuclear weapons should be banned, that existing nuclear weapons should be reduced, and that all nuclear weapons should be abolished in the end.

From this standpoint, we welcomed the measures to remove short-range nuclear weapons that the United States decided to take this time, and we expressed the hope that these measures may be taken at an early date.

In viewing Bush's remarks, we recognize that the United States should also deservedly withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea. At the same time when Bush's proposal was announced, a U.S. military official said that the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea were included in those nuclear weapons to be withdrawn by the United States.

If the United States really withdraws its nuclear weapons as it has promised and removes its nuclear threat to us, it would mean a big stride forward in opening the way for us to sign the nuclear safeguards accord and realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

It is indeed noteworthy that the United States, although belatedly, has admitted of its own accord the existence of its nuclear weapons in South Korea and recognized the necessity of their withdrawal from there, no matter what its motives were in intending to reduce nuclear weapons.

Up to now, the United States and the South Korean authorities said that they cannot confirm the existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, and insisted that the issue of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord and the issue of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea are separate issues. One should say that such insistence is ruined, since the United States announced its measures for reducing nuclear weapons. Thus, the people of the world came to precisely realize that the issue of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord and the issue of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea are inevitably linked to each other.

This clearly proves how just is our allegation that the U.S. nuclear weapons existing in South Korea were a source of disaster constantly threatening our people's right to existence, that in order for us to resolve the issue of the nuclear safeguards accord, the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea must be withdrawn and nuclear threat to us must be removed, and that if nuclear inspection is to be conducted, it should be conducted simultaneously on both the North and the South.

The United States itself admitted the existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea and recognized the necessity of their withdrawal. This also clearly proves how correct and how far-sighted is our allegation that the

issue of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord can be solved only when the U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from South Korea.

Originally, when we joined the Nonproliferation Treaty, we aimed at removing the nuclear threat to our country and turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone. According to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, nuclear weapon states have the obligation not to threaten with nuclear weapons the non-nuclear states which joined the treaty. However, the U.S. nuclear threat to us increased day by day after we joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is shown by the Team Spirit military exercise, which the United States and the South Korean authorities have staged each year by enlarging its scale. It is true that our country is the only non-nuclear member state in the world of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that is exposed to direct nuclear threat from a nuclear-weapon state.

Due to the direct nuclear threat from the United States, we are not in a position to solve the issue of the nuclear safeguards accord. This being the case, the issue of our country's signing the nuclear safeguards accord should be examined by taking such special circumstances into account.

This notwithstanding, the United States, Japan, and the South Korean authorities have not even admitted the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. They took no notice of acts of violating the treaty by a nuclear weapon state when it inflicted a nuclear threat on us. They unilaterally demanded that we sign the nuclear safeguards accord.

At the September meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a so-called a resolution was adopted at Japan's initiative, instigated by the United States, to put international pressure on us to sign the nuclear safeguards accord.

Our country is an independent state and treasures independence more preciously than anything else and highly considers it foremost.

We resolutely reject any attempt to infringe on our country's sovereignty or to interfere in our internal affairs through international pressure. We clearly stated that under the condition in which unjust international pressure is applied, we will not sign any accord and that only when such pressure is removed will we sincerely present ourselves for resolution of the issue of the nuclear safeguards accord. The attempt to apply international pressure on us with this issue has totally ended in failure.

Now it has become clear who has maintained the correct position on the nuclear issue before the people of the world and who has carried out erroneous activities for impure political aims.

The United States and its satellite states still raise our signing of the nuclear safeguards accord as a precondition for improving their relations with us. This is unreasonable and unfeasible talk.

It is not an accident that after the United States announced its plan to reduce nuclear weapons, the South Korean puppets felt so upset and found themselves on pins and needles. Their false statement that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea can no longer be accepted by anyone. It has become as clear as fire that the source of war on the Korean peninsula is in South Korea and that the nuclear threat is within South Korea itself, not from nonexistent nuclear facilities in the North.

It is known to everyone that the sycophantic authorities in South Korea have allowed the U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in South Korea and kept them as carefully as though they were their ancestral tablets, remaining indifferent to the holocaust into which the U.S. nuclear weapons might plunge the whole nation.

It is not strange, therefore, that when their master, the United States, abruptly declared that it would withdraw the nuclear weapons without prior consultation with them, the South Korean authorities should feel upset and doubt the protection by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

A few days before the United States published this measure, the South Korean authorities, unaware of the development of the situation, dared to say that they would mount a military attack on our fictitious nuclear facilities, only to reveal their treacherous and bellicose nature.

Their outburst has become an object of ridicule among the world people today when the United States has committed itself to withdrawing its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The South Korean authorities should precisely realize that they would gain nothing, even if they continuously commit reckless flunkeyist acts.

The South Korean authorities should not entreat the United States to keep nuclear weapons in South Korea but must admit their never-to-be-condoned antinational crimes concerning the problem of nuclear weapons and join in the efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula before it is too late.

Only when peace is guaranteed on the Korean peninsula, where tension and the danger of war are greatly created, can peace in Asia and in the world be ensured. This is an important, mutually, and closely related issue.

The United States must begin the withdrawal of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, which is fraught with the greatest danger of nuclear war, before anywhere else.

In case the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea as it has promised, it must do it comprehensively and totally in all spheres of ground, sea, and sky, and not partially.

The U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea did not come by crossing the ocean by themselves but are being accompanied by armed forces. If the United States withdraws the nuclear weapons from South Korea according to the demand of the times, it should also pull out its armed forces.

The sooner the U.S. troops pull out from South Korea, the better. The world will now closely watch how the U.S. proposal for reducing nuclear weapons will be implemented in South Korea in actuality.

When withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. troops from South Korea is realized at an early date, when the Korean peninsula turns into a nuclear-free zone, and when our country is reunified based on a confederal system, peace in Korea and Asia will be firmly guaranteed.

Demand for Withdrawal of Nuclear Arms From South

*SK1610065091 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0449 GMT 16 Oct 91*

[Text] Pyongyang October 16 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comments on the fact that the United States has shelved the elimination of air-launched nuclear arms in South Korea.

The news analyst says:

This bespeaks that the proposed withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea is not a comprehensive withdrawal but a partial and selected one. It means that the nuclear threat to the DPRK and the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula will still exist and Bush's short-range nuclear disarmament proposal is nothing but an empty talk without authenticity.

The news analyst further says:

The U.S. authorities, in bid to calm down public opinion at home and abroad calling for an immediate withdrawal of their nuclear weapons from South Korea and an end to the policy of nuclear blackmail and cover up their aggressive nature, had not admitted that nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea. And they have asserted in a far-fetched way that the DPRK's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord is one thing and the withdrawal of their nuclear weapons from South Korea is another.

As Bush's nuclear disarmament proposal admitted the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and recognized the necessity of their withdrawal, it has become a stark fact that the DPRK's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord and the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea are inseparably related to each other. It clearly shows the fairness of our proposal claiming that if the problem of the DPRK's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord is to be solved, the U.S. nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from South Korea and the U.S. nuclear threat to the DPRK be

removed, and if the problem of nuclear inspection is to be settled, an inspection should be made for the North and the South simultaneously.

The U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea are the root cause of the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and the permanent threat to the Korean nation's rights to existence. If the United States wants to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea, it should do it from the ground, sea and air totally and completely and the nuclear threat to the DPRK should be removed virtually.

Groups Demand Pullout of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Youth League Statement

*SK1810113191 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1018 GMT 18 Oct 91*

[Text] Pyongyang October 18 (KCNA)—The United States should completely withdraw all its nuclear weapons and troops first of all from the Korean peninsula fraught with the greatest nuclear danger and show the Korean people and the world people its implementation of nuclear disarmament plan as it committed itself. Choe Yong-hae, chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Socialist Working Youth of Korea [LSWYK], said this in a statement issued on October 17.

The United States and the South Korean authorities have not recognized the existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea but insisted we must unilaterally sign the nuclear safeguards accord while misleading world public opinion by saying that the question of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord and the question of withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea are separate issues, he noted, adding:

Today when the United States made public a step for nuclear reduction and announced that nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea are included in it, the world people clearly realised how brazen the claim of the United States is and how unreasonable and subservient the words of some countries which have acted without independence under the baton of the United States are.

The South Korean authorities should not make desperate efforts to resort to the U.S. nuclear umbrella now when the United States announced that it will withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, but admit their indelible crime in trying to impose nuclear disasters upon the whole nation and respond to the DPRK Government's proposal for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, before it is too late.

Our people and youth and students will watch how the United States carries into effect its nuclear disarmament proposal in South Korea.

Peace Committee Statement

*SK2010084591 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0810 GMT 20 Oct 91*

[Text] Pyongyang October 20 (KCNA)—The United States must withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea totally, not partially, and at the same time, pull out its troops, stressed Yi Song-ho, vice-chairman of the Korean National Peace Committee, in a statement issued to the press on October 19.

He went on:

The United States belatedly admitted the existence of its nuclear weapons in South Korea and recognized the necessity of their withdrawal from there along with those deployed in different parts of the world. This clearly shows to the world people once again that correct is our principled stand that the question of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord and the question of withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea are not separate issues but are closely correlated.

The South Korean puppets doubt the “protection by the U.S. nuclear umbrella” and beg for the United States to keep its nuclear weapons in South Korea. This brings into bolder relief their anti-national color that is clearly indifferent to what nuclear holocaust is forced on the country and the nation.

The South Korean authorities must apologize to the whole nation for their indelible treacherous crime with the question of nuclear weapons and turn out to free the Korean peninsula from nuclear weapons, before it is too late.

The United States must not use its commitment to the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons before the world as a show window and trick but radically remove the nuclear threat on us.

Agricultural Union Statement

*SK1910055691 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0445 GMT 19 Oct 91*

[Text] Pyongyang October 19 (KCNA)—The United States should implement as soon as possible its commitment to the reduction of its nuclear weapons and withdraw them first of all from South Korea where the density of their distribution is the highest in the world. Pak Su-tong, chairman of the Central Committee of the Union of Agricultural Working People of Korea, said this in a statement issued to the press on October 18.

The statement noted:

The United States this time admitted the existence of its nuclear weapons in South Korea and recognized the necessity of their withdrawal from South Korea. This reveals that their claim that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea was a lie proceeding from a sinister political aim.

Now reports say that the U.S. decided to postpone the withdrawal of air-launched nuclear weapons even if it withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea. If it is true, the U.S. commitment to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons will be nothing but a show window and trick.

It cannot be said that the U.S. nuclear threat to us has disappeared if its nuclear weapons are partially withdrawn from South Korea.

The United States should totally and comprehensively withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

The South Korean authorities must stop at once repeating bellicose outbursts that they would make “military retaliation” on us, while persistently resorting to the “protection by the U.S. nuclear umbrella”, and must apologize to the whole nation for their anti-national attempts to impose nuclear disasters upon our people and the country.

Newspaper Article

*SK2010095091 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0847 GMT 20 Oct 91*

[“U.S. Nuclear Weapons Should Be Immediately Withdrawn From South Korea”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang October 20 (KCNA)—The United States should take a measure to pull its nuclear weapons out of South Korea at an early date at the present juncture when it proclaimed its unilateral abolition of short-range nuclear weapons, stresses NODONG SINMUN in a by-lined article today.

The denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula presents a more urgent matter than in any other areas either in view of the pressing situation prevailing in this region or in view of the importance of the strategic position of the Korean peninsula, the article points out, and continues:

It is not accidental that military experts say with apprehensions that a nuclear explosion may happen by an accidental case on the Korean peninsula and its flames may easily spread wide.

The presence of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea is a root cause of gravely menacing the Korean nation's right to live and jeopardizing peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

The decisive key to denuclearising the Korean peninsula is to get the U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea.

Our Republic has neither nuclear weapons nor capability and intention to develop them.

What is problem in the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, therefore, is the presence of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

The United States has no conditions to refuse the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from South Korea and no reason and pretext to oppose the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

The present reality changed makes it incumbent upon the United States to positively respond to the proposal of the DPRK for the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from South Korea and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The United States which has contended that it has deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea to keep the Soviet Union from "moving southward" has no more reason to deploy its nuclear weapons in South Korea.

In light of the spirit and requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States, a nuclear-power, should stop opposing or shunning the removal of nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula and its denuclearisation.

For the settlement of the question of signing of the nuclear safeguards accord as well as the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula the U.S. nuclear weapons should be taken out of South Korea without delay.

SOUTH KOREA

Talks on U.S. Nuclear Arms Withdrawal Scheduled

SK0410104391 Seoul YONHAP in English 1012 GMT
4 Oct 91

[Text] Seoul, October 4 (OANA-YONHAP)—Timetable for withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea is an urgent issue, and Seoul and Washington will soon hold talks on it, Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha said Friday.

Yu refused to say exactly when the talks will be held, saying it must be agreed upon by the two sides.

Yu similarly hinted Seoul will make a progressive proposal to Pyongyang at the fourth inter-Korean prime ministers' talks later this month, saying a non-aggression pact demanded by North Korea is not enough to improve Seoul-Pyongyang relations.

Yu, appearing before the National Assembly Foreign Affairs-Unification Committee, said South Korea and the United States will soon negotiate the timetable for pullout of American tactical weapons, hinting early withdrawal of U.S.-deployed nuclear arsenal.

There is no proof that North Korea will refuse outside inspection of its nuclear facilities, Yu told the committee, North Korea is more likely to allow inspection considering the current political climate and its interest.

If North Korea continues to delay it, the United States, Japan, China, the Soviet Union and all other members of

the International Atomic Energy Agency will put heavy pressure on Pyongyang, Yu predicted.

The non-aggression pact demanded by North Korea is not enough by itself to greatly advance inter-Korean relations, the vice foreign minister said.

Considering South and North Korea's parallel entry to the United Nations, the two sides will work on a more well-balanced proposal at the inter-Korean prime ministers' talks, he said.

North-South Talks on Nuclear Issues, Arms Cuts Proposed

SK1010100491 Seoul YONHAP in English 0851 GMT
10 Oct 91

[Text] Seoul, October 10 (YONHAP)—Prime Minister Chong Won-sik told the National Assembly Thursday that Seoul would discuss nuclear issues and arms reduction with Pyongyang if North Korea halted nuclear development, accepted outside inspection of its nuclear facilities and adopted confidence-building measures.

"If North Korea gives up nuclear development, accepts international inspection of its nuclear facilities and takes confidence-building measures, our government can discuss with it nuclear issues as well as cuts in conventional arms," he told the full Assembly.

North Korea had evaded international inspection of its nuclear facilities even though it joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, Chong said, and its nuclear program was a threat to the security of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

"Above all, North Korea should accept nuclear inspection. Tripartite talks for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would be improper," he said.

Reports say North Korea is only a few years away from making an atomic bomb or is already capable of doing so. Governments around the world are pressing the hard-line communist state to open its nuclear facilities to outside inspection, but it refuses to do so, maintaining it will do so only after the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Regarding the fourth round of inter-Korean prime ministers' talks, set to open in Pyongyang on Oct. 22, Chong said he would try his best to produce a "significant and productive" consensus in the meeting and to raise the level of dialogue to that of a summit.

"I will strive to settle questions of non-aggression and the three agreements (travel, transportation and telecommunication) in a package in the prime ministers' talks. I think a consensus can be formed," Chong said.

North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk said in an address to the U.N. General Assembly recently that an inter-Korean summit was possible if the premiers' talks were a success, but Chong said Yon's statement

could not be interpreted as a sign that the North wanted a summit in the near future.

An inter-Korean summit "could not and should not" be used for domestic politics, Chong said.

Organizations Seek Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons

*SK1410032791 Seoul YONHAP in English 0301 GMT
14 Oct 91*

[Text] Seoul, Oct. 14 (YONHAP)—An anti-nuclear organization embracing 15 political and social groups announced on Monday they would seek a National Assembly legislation that would require scrapping or withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from South Korea.

The so-called Committee for Nuclear Disarmament in the Korean Peninsula told a news conference that it will propose the legislation through Yi Hae-chan and six other National Assemblymen.

The legislation, if passed, would ban manufacturing, developing, testing and possession of nuclear weapons in South Korea within one year. It would ban military exercises for the deployment of nuclear weapons and require the submission of all nuclear documents to the National Assembly.

It would also ban aircraft or vessels carrying nuclear weapons from flying over or passing through South Korea's airspace or territorial waters.

The committee, headed by Kye Hun-che, a noted dissident, made no mention of alleged development of nuclear weapons by North Korea.

The committee, which include the National Alliance for Democratic Movement, the country's main dissident organization, and the Korea Anti-Pollution Movement Association, said it has been participating in a signature-signing movement for de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula and adoption of a non-aggression declaration by South and North Korea.

Officials on Reports of U.S. Nuclear Arms Pullout

Ministry Refuses To Confirm Report

*SK2010072391 Seoul YONHAP in English 0702 GMT
20 Oct 91*

[Text] Seoul, Oct. 20 (YONHAP)—The Foreign Ministry on Saturday refused to confirm if the WASHINGTON POST report on nuclear withdrawal from South Korea was true.

A ministry spokesman said he did not know anything about the report. The POST reported on Saturday that the U.S. administration had decided to remove all types of nuclear weapons from South Korea to press for North Korea's opening of its nuclear capability to outside inspection.

"It is true that President No Tae-u met with U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz during his visit to the United Nations last month, but I can't tell what was discussed at that time," the spokesman said.

"It is my understanding that the two countries will closely consult each other further on major security issues including nuclear arms in Korea."

Official: 'No Knowledge'

*SK2110084691 Seoul YONHAP in English 0741 GMT
21 Oct 91*

[Text] Seoul, Oct. 21 (YONHAP)—South Korea and the United States will discuss denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella when their foreign and defense ministers meet in Seoul next month.

They are expected to declare that the U.S. commitment to Korea's defense will not change despite U.S. President George Bush's nuclear initiative.

On Monday, a government official said he had no knowledge of a report in THE WASHINGTON POST that the United States had decided last week to remove all nuclear weapons, including air-delivered warheads, from South Korea.

Consultations on maintaining the nuclear umbrella over Korea were needed if the report was true, he said.

High-level Korean officials have mixed views.

Some say the nuclear umbrella will be maintained by strategic weapons, such as inter-continental ballistic missiles based in the United States, and others say South Korea is automatically protected as air-launched nuclear weapons will remain here.

The two countries have stated a common position championing continuation of the nuclear umbrella in a joint communique at the end of the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) every year.

A systematic device guaranteeing more solid nuclear protection would become necessary if all U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from Korea, he said.

The Korean Government was notified by the United States that it would continue to cover Korea with its nuclear umbrella, he said, declining to go into details.

The two countries have agreed in principle that the second phase of the U.S. troop reduction in Korea will be carried out separately from the nuclear withdrawal. The agreement came in a meeting in Hawaii on Oct. 7-9 to prepare for the annual SCM.

Nuclear Umbrella To Remain

*SK1910114791 Seoul YONHAP in English 1010 GMT
19 Oct 91*

[Text] Seoul, Oct. 19 (YONHAP)—The United States has notified South Korea that it would continue to protect South Korea under its nuclear umbrella, a high-ranking government source said Saturday.

The source was referring to a recent WASHINGTON POST report that the U.S. administration decided to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons, including air-launched ones, from South Korea.

Korea and the United States are having close consultations when it comes to matters of the U.S. forces stationing in Korea, he said.

The sources hinted that the United States might express its position concerning the issue of keeping South Korea under its nuclear umbrella in the 23rd Korea-U.S. security consultation meeting (SCM) slated in Seoul Nov. 20-22.

“The two countries have stated a common position championing the continuation of the nuclear umbrella in a joint communique at the end of the SCM meeting every year,” he said.

NEW ZEALAND

Cabinet To Review Ban on Nuclear-Powered Ships

*BK1410052891 Hong Kong AFP in English 0522 GMT
14 Oct 91*

[Text] Wellington, October 14 (AFP)—A cabinet committee will review New Zealand's legal ban on the entry of nuclear powered vessels, Prime Minister Jim Bolger said Monday [14 Oct].

The ban on nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels was imposed in 1987 by a previous Labour Government in 1987, causing a rift with the United States.

The ban on nuclear-armed ships became academic after President George Bush earlier this month announced a withdrawal of nuclear arms from U.S. surface ships.

Bolger said New Zealand should be as “bold as Bush” in reviewing the law.

He told a press conference that the special committee, made up of Health Minister Simon Upton, Transport and Environment Minister Rob Storey and himself would look at the nuclear propulsion issue, assessing all the available information on its safety.

Bolger said the review would not take a long time, but New Zealanders would want “a very, very high” degree of nuclear safety in any ship visits.

Former Prime Minister Lange Hits New Ships-Calls Policy

*BK1610145491 Hong Kong AFP in English 1437 GMT
16 Oct 91*

[Text] Wellington, Oct 16 (AFP)—Former Labour Prime Minister David Lange slammed the ruling National Party here Wednesday for being in a “whiteman's club” time warp.

Speaking in a parliamentary debate on the government's apparent moves to allow U.S. warships back into New Zealand ports, Lange described the ruling party's approach to foreign policy as “invertebrate, spineless” and “totally shabby.”

“One of the problems of this government is that it is in a time warp of the whiteman's club,” Lange said.

“It is appalled at the idea of New Zealand being reduced, as the minister of defence says, to watching exercises along with Papua New Guinea or being regarded as a South Pacific Forum country.”

He said Prime Minister Jim Bolger had been politically seduced during his meeting in September with U.S. President George Bush in New York.

“I know the pressures the prime minister was under when he went to that meeting in New York because exactly the same seduction was made to me,” he said, adding that the meeting with Bush had been carefully orchestrated by the Americans.

“There were no media present. There was one photograph taken and they wouldn't give it to the prime minister because that means that the entire reward would be there.

“You don't set out to train a dog to do tricks and give him the final feed after he's learnt the first one. It's a gradual process,” Lange said.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Foreign Minister Urges End to French Nuclear Tests

*BK1010071291 Hong Kong AFP in English 0124 GMT
10 Oct 91*

[Text] New York, United Nations, October 9 (AFP)—Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Peter Kenilorea Wednesday urged Paris to put an end to its nuclear arms testing program in the South Pacific.

“We continue to be greatly disappointed with France for its nuclear testing program in the South Pacific” and “once again call on France to put an end to this program,” Kenilorea said in his address to the UN General Assembly.

French diplomat Pierre Menat insisted that France's nuclear testing in the Pacific did not represent any danger to the region's interests or environment.

Kenilorea also criticized France for bestowing the Legion of Honor on Lieutenant Colonel Alain Maffart, whom Kenilorea described as a saboteur, for having sunk a Greenpeace vessel in 1985 in port in Auckland, New Zealand while at the same time France was exploding a nuclear bomb at an underground site on Mururoa atoll.

It was "a crowning act of selfish defiance and belittling by France of the South Pacific nations' concern for their environment and legitimate rights of livelihood," Kenilorea said acidly.

But he did praise France for promoting equitable political and socioeconomic development in New Caledonia, which he said marked a step in the right direction toward islanders' right to self-determination, including independence.

Kenilorea did not refer to the situation in the French archipelago of Tahiti, unlike last year, but was unable to hide his irritation with what he termed France's "protectionist tendencies."

VIETNAM

Foreign Minister Welcomes Bush, Gorbachev Initiatives

BK0910155691 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 9 Oct 91

[Text] On 8 October, during a cordial meeting with Hanoi-based foreign newsmen, answering a TASS correspondent's question about Vietnam's assessment of the Soviet initiative to reduce nuclear arms, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam said: Vietnam always struggles for a peaceful world free of nuclear arms. On this basis, we welcome all initiatives to reduce nuclear arms in the world. We welcome President Gorbachev's recent initiative as well as the U.S. President's statement on the continued reduction of nuclear arms.

We think that the reduction of nuclear arsenals in the world and the reduction of the arms race respond to the aspirations of the world's population. Particularly, we welcome President Gorbachev's proposal for suspending the test of these weapons for a period of time. If similar steps are taken, we will advance a step further to a nuclear-free world which is what all nations desire.

BULGARIA

U.S.-German Statement on European Security Welcomed

AU1710083691 Sofia BTA in English 2314 GMT
17 Oct 91

[Text] Sofia, October 16 (BTA)—Bulgaria welcomes the joint statement made by Mr. Baker and Mr. Genscher as an important step in complete harmony with the Paris summit of November 1990, it is pointed out in a declaration released by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry today.

Bulgaria attaches great importance to complete openness and predictability in the military sphere within the framework of fixed ceiling quantitative levels for the basic types of armaments, it is said in the declaration. An important priority for Bulgaria is the creating of a possibility for the Bulgarian national security problems to be presented at an early stage of the decision-making process. In the proposed North Atlantic Council for Cooperation Bulgaria sees a prospect for the institutionalization of such a possibility.

The declaration points out that the coordination, planning and the taking of joint steps for preventing and solving international critical situations, the joint actions in cases of natural calamities and the solving of environmental problems are other important areas of cooperation. Bulgaria will be ready, if invited, to take an active part in consultations with NATO, the Western European Union and other European organizations on all aspects of future cooperation.

POLAND

Deputy Defense Minister at CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar

LD1110060291 Warsaw PAP in English 2133 GMT
8 Oct 91

[Text] Vienna, October 8—Poland has decided to base her security chiefly on international solidarity. This assumes close cooperation and "equal proximity" to our great neighbours in the West and East, participation in the development of cooperative security regime within the CSCE framework and close ties of cooperation with

the Atlantic alliance, Polish Deputy Minister of Defence Janusz Onyszkiewicz told his counterparts and chiefs of general staffs from 38 countries of the CSCE gathered here for a seminar on military doctrines and concepts.

Onyszkiewicz went on to say that Poland wanted to increase her security through cooperation with Czechoslovakia and Hungary and pointed out that the leaders of the three states had appealed on Sunday for their direct inclusion into the activities of NATO.

The Polish defence official came out for strengthening the institutions of the CSCE, such as the centre for preventing conflicts, by transforming them from discussion forums into decision-making bodies. He said the Polish Armed Forces assumed purely defensive character. All their components and structures which served the old military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact coalition had been eliminated. "We do not consider any state our enemy" and "we do not want to threaten any state," stressed Onyszkiewicz in his address to the Vienna seminar. "Our defence force is built on the principle of adequate strength, which means it guarantees the ability to defend our territory and the inability to mount aggressive operations."

Onyszkiewicz listed practical steps taken to implement these principles, such as the dissolution of heavily armoured units and missile units, as well as big logistic structures. He told the meeting that the manpower of the Polish Armed Forces will be cut to 230 to 250 thousand, to reflect the country's defensive needs, economic situation and the requirements of the CFE. In case of a mobilization Poland will be able to field an army of 750 thousand, said Onyszkiewicz.

He pointed out that the Army must be prepared to counter an attack from any direction. Therefore military units must be deployed evenly on the whole territory of Poland, which means that some units stationed in western Poland will be moved to the east. The country will be divided into four, instead of the present three, military districts.

"The European order as determined in Yalta and Potsdam is a matter of the past," said the Polish delegate in conclusion. "This means a new situation also for Poland. We do not expect, at least in the foreseeable future, a military danger to our existence, but we do perceive the need for filling the security vacuum now existing in central and eastern Europe."

ARGENTINA

Official on Ratification of Tlatelolco Treaty
*PY2010203691 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish
1701 GMT 20 Oct 91*

[Text] Rosario, 20 Oct (TELAM)—Foreign Ministry adviser Carlos Escude said here that Argentina may ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty on nonnuclear weapon proliferation although “no preparations have been made yet to have the case analyzed by the national Congress.”

In statements to the media in Rosario, Escude said: “The subject is being studied and the government regards it

positively and with good will,” although, he said, “little progress has been made yet.”

Escude said: “Old Foreign Ministry officials now say that there currently exist some contextual elements that, if ratified, may suppress some problems that turned up as the result of a negative position.”

However, he added that “those old officials” from the Foreign Ministry who “now think that it would be positive to ratify the treaty” also suggest “amending it, if possible, in some points that are not in keeping—not with the Argentine position—but with the evolution of technology and history.”

INDIA

Foreign Office Statement on Bush Initiative

92WP0027A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 1 Oct 91
p 9

[Article by K.K. Katyal: "India Welcomes U.S. Disarmament Plan"]

[Text] New Delhi, September 30—India today welcomed the nuclear disarmament package announced by the U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, and expressed the belief that it would accelerate the movement towards a nuclear weapon-free world.

The reaction came in the form of a prepared statement by the Foreign Office spokesman today, the first working day after the week-end recess, when Mr. Bush made known his unilateral decision. Those in the capital's diplomatic corps who saw a meaning in the "delay" in New Delhi's comments will be revising their opinion now. The fact that both the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Madhavsinh Solanki, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Muchkand Dubey, are out of the country these days, has also to be taken into account.

India has good reasons to react positively to the U.S. announcement. The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons was an important component of the action plan, outlined at the U.N. by the late Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, for the total removal of the nuclear menace, and was, thus in line with New Delhi's approach. The decision to withdraw the sea-based nuclear cruise missiles, hopefully, implies a thinning of the U.S. nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean as well, even though there is no change in regard to the strategic base at Diego Garcia. An important element in the escalation scenario will be removed and the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons raised.

Mr. Bush's decision is certain to add to pressures for concrete steps in the Indian sub-continent against nuclear proliferation. In the past, the U.S. supported the proposal of Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif for five-nation talks for converting South Asia into a nuclear-free zone. India, however, rejected the plan as propagandist. Washington may take the view that the unilateral steps, announced by Mr. Bush and hailed by the Soviet Union, provide new options to India. New Delhi may find it hard not to re-think its stand on nuclear issues.

The text of the spokesman's statement is as follows:

"The Government of India welcomes the announcement made by President Bush for the unilateral elimination by USA of another entire category of nuclear weapons, namely the ground-launched, short-range nuclear weapons. We have also noted the proposals for further cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals of USA and the Soviet Union. These along with the decision of the U.S. Government to withdraw all the sea-based nuclear cruise

missiles and to lower the state of alert of its strategic nuclear forces, are steps towards reducing the danger of nuclear war.

"It may be recalled that the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons constituted an important element of the action plan proposed by India in June, 1988 in the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We are, therefore, encouraged to believe that these measures will accelerate the movement towards a nuclear weapon-free world."

Bush Initiative Term 'Long Overdue'

92WP0026A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 1 Oct 91
p 8

[Article by C. Raja Mohan: "New Dimension to Nuclear Debate"]

[Text] The sweeping cuts in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals proposed by the U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, have been long overdue. But better late than never. For quite some time the over-sized nuclear armories of Washington and Moscow have been at odds with the altered political reality since the late Eighties. In seeking to align the U.S. nuclear posture to the new strategic circumstances, the Bush initiative is welcome. Besides it opens the post-Cold War era in international nuclear politics.

Scepticism Shed

Although it has taken a long while the Bush Administration has finally shed its caution and scepticism on the nuclear front. The profound changes in the international scene—the Soviet reformation under Mr. Gorbachev, its external strategic retrenchment since the mid-Eighties, the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the second half of 1989, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon, the reunification of Germany and the increasing internal chaos in the Soviet Union—seemed to make little dent on the U.S. nuclear policy.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed during Mr. Bush's visit to the Soviet Union at the end of July reflected this terrible status in nuclear thinking. START, the result of two decades of Superpower negotiations, was symbolic of the old mindset on nuclear arms control incorporating only small reductions in the Superpower nuclear arsenals. The arms control annual was so dominant in Moscow that the U.S. officials were hinting at a 'time-out' in the disarmament process. The world seemed set for a major pause in Superpower disarmament efforts after the recent Moscow summit.

Radical Thinking

The failed Soviet coup less than three weeks after the Moscow summit has now forced a radical nuclear rethinking in Washington. The Soviet coup raised a host

of issues relating to the command and control of nuclear weapons. The seizing of the 'football' (the briefcase containing the nuclear launch codes) from Mr. Gorbachev by the coup plotters pointed to the dangers of unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. There were also fears of a rebel commander using the nuclear weapons at his disposal to blackmail the rest of the world. Further the reworking of the Soviet Union into a loose confederation brought into relief the uncertain future of nearly 30,000 Soviet nuclear weapons.

The Soviet coup was only one factor that shook the Bush Administration out of its nuclear complacency. There has been increasing pressure from the European allies for a redefinition of the American nuclear doctrine. In its newly assertive mood, Germany has been demanding the removal of all tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe.

Germany, until now littered with these weapons of both NATO and the Soviet Union, has had a special stake in the elimination of these weapons. In a separate move France had demanded a meeting of the four European nuclear powers—the U.S., the USSR, France and Britain—to discuss the new nuclear situation in Europe in the context of the Soviet transformation. Mr. Bush has no taste for another round of blood-letting in NATO over the nuclear issues and hence the urgency of seizing the diplomatic high ground in the nuclear debate within NATO.

In essence, the far-reaching U.S. proposals have five main elements. Most of them, for a change are unilateral in nature with the expectation of a reciprocal response from the Soviet Union. There are a few suggestions for Soviet-American negotiations.

The first element is the move for the withdrawal and destruction of most of the tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons, which are ground and sea-based. These include nuclear artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons based on surface ships and submarines and nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft. The military rationale for these weapons, particularly the ground-based ones, has been steadily eroding since the mid-Eighties. The original justification for deploying these weapons in their thousands in Europe (and a few hundreds in South Korea) was the need to counter the alleged Soviet superiority in conventional military forces.

Transformation

The transformation of the European political landscape from confrontation to cooperation, the unilateral conventional force reductions initiated by Mr. Gorbachev in December 1988 followed by a Europe-wide agreement (the CFE treaty) on the reduction of conventional forces that came into effect in 1990 had made the ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons redundant. And the Soviet coup showed that these weapons floating around in Europe could be dangerous as well.

While the withdrawal of the ground-based tactical weapons has been on the cards, Mr. Bush's decision to include the naval tactical nuclear weapons is indeed a pleasant surprise. Although these weapons made little military sense, the U.S. Navy had been zealously guarding against their inclusion in any arms control process until now. Although Mr. Bush is proposing to keep some of these weapons under central stores and is planning to retain some air-delivered theatre weapons in Europe, we are now very close to the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. and the USSR.

The second major significance of the Bush initiative is that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons ends the widespread forward deployment by the U.S. of nuclear weapons in most theatres of the world. It opens the process of pushing the nuclear weapons back to their home territories and limiting the process of spatial proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers. Although the strategic missile submarines will continue to roam the waters of the world, the widespread dispersal of nuclear weapons on land and sea will now become a thing of the past. This should certainly please the large number of peace groups and governments that have opposed nuclear ships' visits by the Superpower navies to the ports of other nations.

Reducing Dangers

Third, the world can now sleep much better with the knowledge that many American nuclear weapons would be taken off the "alert" status thus reducing the dangers of an unintended or accidental nuclear war. As the U.S. and the Soviet Union piled weapon upon weapon and missile upon missile during the Cold War and were locked in a perpetual confrontation, many nuclear weapons had been kept on a hair-trigger alert leaving the danger of an accidental war never remote. Mr. Bush has now initiated the process of reversing this tendency.

Mr. Bush has also begun the streamlining of the command and control procedures relating to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In seeking to make the operational command of strategic nuclear forces more direct, Mr. Bush has created a single U.S. Strategic Command with both the Navy and Air Force participating. He has also proposed discussions with Moscow on technical cooperation in the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads, enhancing the physical safety and security of nuclear weapons and bilateral discussions on strengthening command and control procedures in order to avoid an accidental nuclear war.

Beginning of Transition

The fourth major significance of the Bush initiative is the beginning of the transition from the doctrine of 'mutual assured destruction' (MAD) to one of minimum deterrence. The MAD strategy operationally required thousands of nuclear weapons to ensure that a surprise

first strike by the adversary could be absorbed and a crippling counter-blow could yet be delivered. With the adversarial context among the Superpowers disappearing, it is now logically possible for both sides to move towards a posture of minimum deterrence based on small nuclear deterrents. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has proposed reductions to as low as 3,000 nuclear warheads each. Others have suggested that 1,000 warheads could be an adequate minimum deterrent.

Mr. Bush is not yet ready to accept such radical suggestions, but has begun the movement towards arsenals smaller than those envisaged less than two months ago under START. He has declared that he hopes to make the Superpower arsenals "smaller, safer and more stable." He has terminated the MX missile programme and the mobile small ICBM (the Midgetman), as well as offered to negotiate with the Soviets the elimination of all land-based multiple warhead missiles from the two inventories. This is certainly a radical agenda for the stabilisation of Soviet-American deterrence. But it could be less than fair to the Soviet Union. Under the Bush proposals the U.S. would keep its powerful Trident multiple warhead missiles deployed at sea. The Soviets will have to give up the heart of their deterrent deployed on land. Unlike the Americans the Soviets have fewer strategic weapons at sea, given their difficult access to oceans and lack of global naval reach. The Soviet bargaining power, of course, is not very much these days.

After opposing Star Wars all these years, Mr. Gorbachev is now under pressure from Mr. Bush to come to terms with it. It would not be surprising if he returns to Mr. Reagan's idea (it seemed outlandish in 1983) on Soviet-American cooperation to develop missile defences. After all it is the Soviet Union that is surrounded by missile powers and may well need defences against them. Mr. Gorbachev has pointed to the absence in the Bush

initiative of any reference to the comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Mr Gorbachev has also raised the important issue of bringing other nuclear powers into the nuclear disarmament process.

Whatever the nature of the final response of the Soviet Union, the Bush initiative alters in a basic manner the international nuclear debate. With dramatic reductions of their own, the U.S. and the USSR are now in a much better position to get the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty extended indefinitely in 1995, demand universal adherence to the NPT and strengthen the IAEA verification procedures by making them more intrusive and stringent with the experience now being gained in disarming Iraq.

India, traditionally a major actor on international disarmament diplomacy and a trenchant critic of the NPT, must now respond in a manner that will protect its basic strategic interests as well as propel the nuclear disarmament process forward.

Call for Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

*BK1810083991 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English
0730 GMT 18 Oct 91*

[Text] India has called for total elimination of all nuclear weapons, missile technology, and the export market for conventional weapons. Speaking at the United Nations' committee, the member of the Indian delegation, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, said the world cannot rid itself of the threat of nuclear weapons without a change in the attitude of the nuclear powers. He said the only way to eliminate all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is to accept the action plan suggested by India to destroy these weapons in three phases spread over a period of 22 years.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Arms Elimination Procedures, Costs Urged

PM1110102991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Golts "Observer's Opinion": "Reply Without Threat"]

[Text] The Soviet Union will take counteractions... From the time of that very famous poster depicting an aircraft with a fist in the shape of a fig instead of a propeller and the inscription "Our reply to Chamberlain" until recently this concept was invested with very definite meaning. We were being threatened: They were organizing military provocations, concentrating troops on the borders, creating the atom bomb, deploying the strategic triad, developing SDI. And we were taking countermeasures. That is, we too were threatening.

And now it seems that the film will be run backward: The disarmament race is beginning. Our reply to Bush, who has proposed a really radical reduction in nuclear arsenals, has followed quickly, despite the opinion of skeptics. And it has been heard quite definitely. I will not retell it. I will only point out that we have largely agreed with Washington. Both as regards radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, and in taking strategic systems off alert status, and in ending the development of individual types of offensive arms. We have proposed going further in some respects: not to place in storage but to eliminate naval tactical arms. And to place landmines [fugas] and front-line aviation missiles in storage. There are other proposals too. And I do not see here any desire to outdo the Americans. It is, rather, that increased trust is encouraging the sides to take increasingly bold steps. The Soviet Union, for example, has declared a moratorium on nuclear tests and again urged [the United States] to subscribe to it. Only recently people in the United States would have regarded this as an act of pure propaganda. But, citing official administration spokesmen, THE WASHINGTON TIMES now reports that "under the new conditions the United States might reconsider its negative attitude to the introduction of tougher restrictions on nuclear tests."

The thing is that the Soviet Union now takes a totally different approach to disputed problems. Let us take the question of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles. I will remind you that Bush has proposed beginning talks on the elimination of such ground-launched missiles, leaving aside those missiles deployed on submarines. The USSR evidently disagrees with such an approach. But, at the same time, Moscow displays understanding of Washington's concern. And therefore M.S. Gorbachev draws attention to the fact that 134 of the 503 ICBM's which have been taken off alert status have multiple reentry vehicles, that we will not modernize missile complexes on railroad flatcars, and that we will remove several missile-carrying submarines from the arsenal.

Moscow is also seeking a compromise on such a complex problem as SDI. We suggest to the United States that the possibility be examined of creating joint systems to warn of a nuclear missile strike with ground- and space-based elements.

The measures proposed by M.S. Gorbachev can also resolve some of our internal political problems. For, as far as I understand it, it is proposed to eliminate weapons, a considerable proportion of which I am afraid will become (or have already become?) an object of dispute between the republics and the center. It seems that it is now, after M.S. Gorbachev's statement, the turn of the republic leaders to state their position clearly and definitely.

The voices of skeptics are to be heard asking: Will the disarmament race not be just as ruinous as the arms race? There are grounds for such anxiety. Unlike the United States, where a broad debate is already being conducted over what Bush's initiatives will mean for the economy, in our country emotions reign. The thing is that neither the public nor the legislators know how much it costs to create particular types of weapons. Nor do they know what it will cost to place them in storage or eliminate them.

Meanwhile, what M.S. Gorbachev needs today, in my view, is not so much support for his initiatives abroad as understanding on the part of the USSR population. The very population that is concerned not so much about the threat of nuclear war as about the coming hungry and cold winter. It is to its feelings that those who declare that disarmament is disastrous for our economy appeal. In this situation the president must be followed up by those who will say just how it is proposed to eliminate nuclear weapons and how much this will cost.

Bush Said Concerned Over 'Interethnic Conflicts' in USSR

LD1210182991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1632 GMT 10 Oct 91

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Oct—According to many U.S. specialists, the danger of transferring part of the Soviet nuclear weapons under the control of the republics striving for secession from the USSR, or of irresponsible groups participating in interethnic conflicts in the Soviet Union, has defined to a considerable degree the nature and scale of the recent disarmament initiative by U.S. President G. Bush.

At a news conference on 28 October in Washington, U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney expressed confidence that "the Soviet Union preserves a centralized monitoring over its systems, and that the possibility of a non-sanctioned missile launch or of a transfer of nuclear armaments under the control of irresponsible persons is relatively small". However, the Pentagon chief expressed apprehension with regard to a situation which could

appear in the USSR in future—"in two or three years"—and stressed that one of the two parts of Bush's program envisages some measures to be taken jointly with the USSR "on consolidating stability and security of the two sides' nuclear arsenals".

The dramatic events which developed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have led to a change in priorities in Washington's policy. From now on the most important problem for the United States is not a counteraction to the "Soviet military threat" but a possibility of destabilizing the situation in the USSR, with unpredictable consequences. The U.S. mass media publish extensive materials on the possible consequences of Soviet nuclear armaments not under the control of the center. An observer of the "NEWSWEEK" magazine is particularly worried by the fact that "86 army divisions in non-Russian republics are equipped with nuclear battlefield weapons". "THE NEW YORK TIMES" does not exclude the possibility that these nuclear armaments "could be used in military actions between the republics".

A probable appearance of "new bosses" of the Soviet nuclear weapons may be assessed in different ways. However, it is obvious that such a development of events could turn out to be a catastrophe not only for the Soviet Union but for Europe and the whole world.

The stakes are too high. Even if there is only one chance out in a thousand of a seizure of nuclear weapons by irresponsible persons, it is necessary to take all possible measures in order to prevent its realization. In the present conditions it is particularly important to observe not only the letter but also the spirit of the multilateral treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Not just the safeguarding of nuclear installations in the USSR is under discussion, though it is also very important. It seems that it is necessary to take the whole spectrum of political, juridical, military, and even economic decisions by all USSR republics which could ensure that the possibility of an armed attempt to seize nuclear weapons, or of establishing control over them by other means absolutely would have no prospects. Obviously an understanding of the necessity of all these measures by the United States and other Western countries will be necessary, and probably their assistance as well in maintaining a regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.

Military Leaders Assess Bush, Gorbachev Initiatives

Chief of Staff Comments

PM1110144591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Oct 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent A. Naryshkin report: "Soviet Side Has Not Shown Haste"]

[Text] Moscow, 9 October—The decisions of the USSR and U.S. presidents are in accord with each other and are

in keeping with the provisions of the treaty on strategic offensive arms [START], Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, stated in an interview with your TASS correspondent today.

As far as tactical weapons are concerned, there is a definite closeness of positions here. We carried out, he stressed, a detailed analysis of the American side's proposals and looked at how they accord with the provisions of the START Treaty and sit with the overall scheme of the disarmament process, and then made the decision on reciprocal moves. Thus, the Soviet side did not show haste in responding to George Bush's initiatives.

The steps taken by the two countries did not catch us unawares, the chief of the General Staff continued. The dynamics and logic of the disarmament process force us to work to the future, to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, as designated by Gorbachev several years ago now. Although it was difficult to predict certain details of the proposals made (including those regarding the complete destruction of nuclear mines and the removal from service and partial elimination of nuclear warheads for surface-to-air missiles).

But we also had a surprise in store for the Americans, the general said, meaning the withdrawal of all nuclear munitions from combat units of the tactical air force. This formulation of the question was not, by all accounts, expected in the United States. The American side is now studying the proposal.

"The third zero"—100-percent elimination of tactical weapons—is not yet in being. But the nuclear munitions for artillery and tactical missiles will be completely destroyed. And this already marks a large step forward, Lobov said.

It is possible to speak not of a nuclear disarmament race, but of an initiatives race, he said. However, we do have the time to think, analyze, draw conclusions, and carry out practical deeds. Neither side needs haste in this matter. While actively advancing the disarmament process, the interests of industry, including the defense industry, should not be forgotten. If normal conversion ensues and the technology released as a result of the cutback in basic production is directed toward civil needs, the results could be very appreciable.

The USSR attitude toward the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty has remained invariable to date. The readiness expressed by the Soviet side to discuss the American proposals on nonnuclear antimissile defense systems will not, I think, lead to hasty revision of the treaty, the army general said. At the same time, in his assessment, the USSR's lag behind the United States in the sphere of developing and creating such systems is proportional to our technology's lag behind the Americans'. "Catching up" with the United States in this sphere requires

enormous economic and scientific investment. But the results ultimately obtained should be used to the full extent in the civil sectors. Our most grievous error is that we developed military science and technology at the expense of allowing the civil sectors to fall behind, whereas the economy of the entire country should have been pushed forward and the resources for defense needs then derived from this potential. Only with such a situation will we be able to have a strong national economy and modern defense system.

In declaring yet again a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, we expect a commensurate and constructive response from the U.S. side, particularly the entire public of that country, the chief of the General Staff stressed. And perestroika and the "conversion" of thinking are to a certain extent necessary to the American military too, he concluded.

Defense Minister Lauds 'Disarmament Race'

*LD1210123391 Moscow Radio Rossiia Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 12 Oct 91*

[Text] Commenting on a decision by the USSR State Council supporting proposals put forward by the USSR president regarding disarmament issues, Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said that at the moment the disarmament process is like a disarmament race. It is good, he said, that we are leaving the arms race for a disarmament race. Everyone understands that there are no factors undermining USSR and U.S. security, which is why both states are trying to get rid of the burden of arms as soon as possible, Shaposhnikov noted.

The defense minister also stressed that practical steps lie ahead. Specialists from both countries ought to work out a mechanism for the implementation of an agreement process and hold specific negotiations. Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov did not rule out the possibility of a USSR-U.S. summit once specialists reach their final conclusions.

Officer Warns Against Arms Cuts 'Euphoria'

*PM1110105691 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 11 Oct 91 p 3*

[Colonel D. Belskiy article: "The Disarmament Race: On Moscow's and Washington's New Initiatives"]

[Text] There is currently no shortage of euphoric assessments of the U.S. and Soviet initiatives in the nuclear disarmament sphere. It is also claimed—though with some reservations—that we are living in a totally new period in world politics, that real disarmament is embarking on a "sprint race," and that there is hope that the process of reducing strategic nuclear arsenals to a minimum will proceed with new speed, especially since Russia has also put forward its own initiative, which envisages an even deeper reduction in nuclear arsenals.

There are, of course, grounds for optimism. Following the conclusion of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms

[START], the technical problems concerning strategic offensive arms reductions seem to have been more or less resolved. As for tactical weapons, here much work evidently lies ahead, despite the existence of the will to eliminate them.

It is symptomatic that Soviet-U.S. consultations on nuclear disarmament questions have begun at precisely this time. There is, therefore, reason to speak of a joint Soviet-U.S. initiative. It is to be hoped that specialists will not become bogged down in technical problems, as has happened before, and that all the contentious issues will be dealt with on the basis of a desire to resolve them.

The USSR president's proposals are very solid and contain no surprises. Reducing nuclear arsenals is a basic priority in the Soviet Union's policy, as was declared back in January 1986. Developing this idea, the proposal on the "third nuclear zero"—the total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—was put forward. This was the USSR's official position.

President G. Bush's initiative is the first step in this direction. It is noteworthy that last year's compilation "Soviet Military Might: 1990" identified the USSR's goal as being to rule out the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear systems in Europe. The USSR has also taken unilateral steps in this direction on its own account, and began to withdraw nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe even before the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact. Even earlier, submarines carrying nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from the Baltic Sea.

But it must be admitted that the fact that the USSR was superarmed with tanks and tactical nuclear weapons made it impossible for the United States and its allies to trust it. Moreover, at that time the Soviet Army also had SS-20 medium-range missiles in its armory, and the Americans had Pershing-2's, which destabilized the situation in Europe to the utmost.

You only have to look back at recent history to understand why the American leadership has taken the initiative in the disarmament sphere, without having yet abandoned the concept of "nuclear deterrence."

First and foremost, concepts involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as corresponding military development programs, were formulated in NATO as a reaction to Soviet superiority in the conventional arms sphere. Military men and politicians were hypnotized by the idea of the hypothetical tank offensive that would roll all the way to the Atlantic coast. Only recently, in 1989, during the debate in NATO on the need to modernize tactical nuclear weapons, J. Baker and M. Thatcher insistently explained to their allied opponents that the bloc needs these weapons as long as Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional arms—and therefore the threat of a successful advance by troops in Europe—persists.

The initial premise on Soviet superiority, called into question by the opponents of modernization, prevailed.

At that time people were still unable to believe in the sincerity of the Soviet defensive doctrine, proclaimed in 1986. However, the course of events confirmed the fact that the times are changing, and we are changing with them. In 1991 the possibility of a war in Europe is not realistic, and the conceptual basis for siting tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is substantially undermined. An understanding has arrived that mastery of the "military atom" is not the only measure of might.

In the military-strategic concepts and simulation models of both NATO and the now defunct Warsaw Pact, tactical weapons were almost always present in scenarios of the escalation of military conflict in Europe. Thus the concepts of "flexible response," "nuclear threshold," "limited nuclear war in Europe," and so forth, arose. Naturally, these concepts found concrete expression in programs for developing the armed forces. Each side, at a certain level of "conflict," when the point at which they recognized their own lack of superiority was reached, sought to shift the conflict to a new, "more advantageous" level.

The U.S. President has put forward his initiative at a propitious moment, when the threat of global nuclear confrontation has begun to decline. It appears that the American side has taken on itself the initiative of bringing the USSR Armed Forces closer to the level of "reasonable sufficiency" which forms the basis of Soviet military doctrine. Hitherto the approach toward that level has proceeded through necessity, under the pressure of changes affecting the USSR's security, such as the unification of Germany, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the consequent withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe.

The range of Soviet initiatives is indeed broad. It includes tactical nuclear weapons, strategic offensive nuclear arms, and a one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. The commitments taken on by the Soviet side also extend to naval arms, which were formerly not part of the disarmament process.

It is noteworthy that the USSR and the United States are removing all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and multipurpose submarines. As is well known, this was one of the points on which the USSR and the United States had hitherto been unable to reach agreement. The initiative was put forward by the United States, but resolving the problem of naval arms, including nuclear arms, is of very great significance for the USSR's security. The emphasis that the United States places on naval forces is well known.

Disagreements still persist as regards tactical nuclear weapons in front-line (tactical) aviation combat units. And in Europe the United States is proposing to keep an "effective nuclear aviation potential."

In this situation, can one speak of a concession to the West, a loss of superpower status? Indeed, with the elimination of tactical nuclear systems, especially in Europe, the benefits for the United States are

undoubted: The USSR is destroying incomparably more of them. Furthermore the initiatives regarding cuts in strategic and tactical arms do not affect the French and British nuclear components.

The NATO bloc has always been exceptionally sensitive to encroachments on the nuclear component of its armed forces. As for its tactical component, here the West has invariably opposed reductions, despite the USSR's quantitative superiority in this category of weapons.

The security benefits of implementing the initiatives are undoubtedly. The range of tactical weapons and, most important, the large number of them in Europe make the continent very vulnerable, since tactical nuclear weapons here acquire a strategic role. The elimination of land-based tactical nuclear weapons is in accordance with the requirements of the new European security structures: the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the pressing demand for a change in NATO's strategic concepts.

The new process has been called the disarmament race. Moscow and Washington, it is believed, have a "medicine" capable of curing the diseases of their state budgets and converting a significant section of military industry. The burden that they bear as nuclear powers will thus be lightened.

The danger associated with the very existence of nuclear arsenals is also lessened. Substantial reductions in arsenals in strategic weapons coupled with limitations on the development of mobile missiles strengthen strategic stability.

Great significance is also attached to the unilateral one-year moratorium on nuclear tests. But its significance will only become really clear if in the course of the current year talks on a ban on nuclear tests on a worldwide scale make progress.

Back to that euphoria.

It is true that Europe could become a "nuclear-free zone." But many questions arise. First and foremost, about the time scale for nuclear disarmament. This has not yet been agreed. The process of reduction is also unclear—as regards the quantities in which tactical nuclear weapons will be either totally eliminated or returned to storage depots. The Bush initiative envisages both, but does not say in what proportions these processes will take place.

But how far is it possible for the country to carry out such deep cuts? The process now under way in the disarmament sphere is already being called a race by some people. And any race can have various consequences. Undoubtedly the economic crisis, excessive strain in the sphere of finance, and general political instability are obstacles on the path to resolute steps in this sphere. And specialists predict substantial expenditure on disarmament before any material benefits can be expected to appear. Without a doubt, in time the renunciation of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, will justify

itself. But for the moment it is necessary to seek the right ways of converting the industry that used to produce nuclear munitions. It may also be possible to find the right solutions as regards salvaging them and making use of them in various sectors of the economy. But for the time being the question is: How long will the nuclear munitions remain in the depots? Presumably that will also cost a lot.

The "residual phenomena" in the strategic thinking of the former "adversaries" are also worrying. According to the declared "new defense strategy," the security of the United States and the entire planet will be based on limited "nuclear deterrent" forces. Thus the initiative leaves unchanged the plans for deploying a new generation of air-based tactical nuclear missiles.

The mutual renunciation of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the reduction of strategic missiles, the ending of nuclear tests, the joint development of systems against the nuclear danger—such actions, it may be hoped, will strengthen European and global security.

U.S. Reaction to 'Disarmament Race' Viewed

LD1310190191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Oct 91

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Vitaliy Kobysh, with correspondent Boris Kalyagin report from Washington, with portions recorded]

[Text] [Kobysh] The world—especially the United States, Western Europe, and Japan—is closely watching the changes in our country. They are not only watching; they are acting and reacting. At the same time they are experiencing serious alarm while observing the disintegration of such a large nuclear power as the Soviet Union. Of course, this is what the U.S. President's most important initiative is connected with. He announced plans to eliminate all U.S. tactical and some other types of weapons. As we all know, Moscow's response was immediate: It announced an even greater quantity of eliminated weapons. As a result, the following sentence, which is music to one's ears, began to go around the world: The arms race has been replaced by a disarmament race. A disarmament race. That's nice, that's fine, although so far it does not cover every country and every type of weapon. But this is undoubtedly a serious breakthrough. How is it seen in the United States?

[Correspondent Boris Kalyagin] Washington today speaks of a principally new approach to arms control. So far the sides have strictly observed the principle of strict parity in nuclear forces. In preparing agreements, experts carefully used to count every single warhead, lest the potential opponent might have a few missiles more. And that was in conditions when the nuclear arsenals of each side allowed it to wipe the other off the face of the earth

several times over. Now the Soviet Union has undertaken to destroy thousands more strategic weapons than was envisaged by the strategic offensive weapons treaty.

Some U.S. military specialists assume that the new Soviet initiative results in part from Moscow's intention to eliminate nuclear weapons on the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. But in any event this step reflects growing trust in the relations between the USSR and the United States. Also, the Soviet president's agreement to examine the idea of creating a nonnuclear system of antimissile defense, to which we had been firmly against, has made an impression here. Americans admit that the measures announced by the Soviet leader go much further than those declared by the U.S. President.

Not all of these give rise to enthusiasm from the U.S. Administration. So far Washington is clearly not ready to halt nuclear tests or reduce its strategic nuclear forces, by another half. The U.S. military has also come out against the destruction of nuclear bombs carried by U.S. tactical aircraft stationed in Western Europe. And although optimistic statements have appeared in the U.S. press that the arms race the USSR and the United States have been involved in for more than four decades is nearing an end, quite a few American politicians hold another point of view.

[Begin recording] [Kalyagin] Senator, after the initiative by our presidents, do you think the arms race is coming to an end?

[John Warner, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, former U.S. naval secretary; in English fading to Russian translation] No, I do not, because your country and the United States are continuing to modernize their nuclear arsenals. I think that in respect of conventional types of weapons, such as tanks, this race has significantly lessened. But it is important that both countries continue to modernize nuclear weapons so that we have more stability and fewer chances for doing what we fear most of all—delivering the first strike.

But the Bush and Gorbachev decisions were very well received in the United States. They represent an important step forward toward greater stability in relations between our countries.

[Kalyagin] What is your attitude to President Gorbachev's proposal to cut strategic offensive weapons by a further 50 percent?

[Warner] I think we will review this proposal very seriously. But after all such cuts we have to preserve stability, and we are moving toward that.

[Kalyagin] Have you discussed in your committee, on armed services, the decisions adopted by the two presidents?

[Warner] Yes, we had a preliminary discussion. I have also had an opportunity to meet the President and exchange views with him.

[Kalyagin] What is your appraisal of President Gorbachev's proposals, your colleague's appraisal?

[Warner] A very positive appraisal. There was a very favorable reaction in the Congress. We will soon be examining a batch of proposals on providing assistance to your people, in particular, food and medicines. But such assistance should be appropriately answered in the form of a further reduction of tension. For instance, if we provide assistance for you this winter, and in our country a great desire to do so is being expressed, you have to show that you are ready to take further steps in lessening military tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the Soviet Union and the European countries.

[Kalyagin] What steps are you expecting from us?

[Warner] Why do you have so many plants manufacturing tanks? Let us convert these enterprises so that they produce goods for the civilian population, goods which you could export, sell to other countries. You have so many talented engineers. You have to remove them from military production and send them to civilian industries.

[Kalyagin] Would you provide us with technical cooperation for such conversion?

[Warner] Yes, we would provide you with technical assistance, but you also have to carry out economic reforms.

[Kalyagin] Do you intend helping President Bush to realize the cutbacks in nuclear weapons.

[Warner] Yes, Congress intends to cooperate with President Bush and indirectly with President Gorbachev, in order to help in the implementation of the decision announced by them, and also in order to provide the Soviet republics with food and medical assistance, and technical cooperation. [end recording]

Russian Foreign Ministry Backs 'More Radical' Proposals

PM1010154391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by G. Charodeyev: "Russian Foreign Ministry Favors More Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions"]

[Text] Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. under secretary of state, left Moscow for Washington on the night of 7-8 October, earlier than scheduled. As is known, he was holding consultations in our country on a radical reduction in the two countries' nuclear arsenals.

Such haste on the part of the senior U.S. official is evidently explained by the fact that he intends to bring to his President's attention the latest initiatives put forward by the Soviet leadership and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The Russian proposals made at the meeting with the U.S. under secretary of state in Moscow boil down to the fact that, by way of more radical strategic offensive arms reductions than were envisaged by the corresponding treaty between the USSR and the United States, the number of strategic nuclear warheads on the USSR's side on expiry of the seven-year period of reductions should total not around 50 percent of the current level, as proposed by President M. Gorbachev, but "somewhat less."

IZVESTIYA's correspondent was informed by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Foreign Ministry that the Russian side is proposing an initiative to start talks on a further radical reduction in strategic offensive arms not by one-half but by two-thirds. As is known, the main part of the USSR's nuclear potential is located on RSFSR territory.

During the conversation, the Russian minister stated that nuclear weapons are and will remain under centralized unified control and that the proposals put forward are aimed at assisting the Soviet-U.S. dialogue in this sphere.

Commenting on the RSFSR Foreign Ministry's position at the IZVESTIYA correspondent's request, USSR Foreign Minister Boris Pankin said: "USSR President M. Gorbachev's initiative is being undertaken after considerable expert study and expresses in concentrated form the republics' aggregate interests. Representatives of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan participated in the consultations with the U.S. delegation that visited Moscow.

"The Russian Foreign Ministry statement once more reaffirms the mood in our country in favor of radical measures on nuclear disarmament. The statement is based on the center's initiatives and endorses them, indicating the horizons of a possible future reduction in nuclear weapons. I would especially like to single out the decisiveness with which the Russian Foreign Ministry came out in favor of banning nuclear tests, which, as you know, is entirely in keeping with the political line of the USSR president and State Council."

Moves on Strategic, Tactical Nuclear Arms, SDI Assessed

LD1610111891

[Editorial Report] Moscow All-Union Radio First Program and Orbital Networks in Russian at 1130 GMT on 13 October carries the scheduled 30-minute "International Review" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov.

The first topic is the latest nuclear disarmament moves. Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev, disarmament expert and deputy general director of the Center for International and Military-Political Research at the Russian-American University, sums up the new U.S. and Soviet initiatives and explains the reasons for them: fears

of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe have passed; the United States believes a much smaller nuclear arsenal will still be effective; the Soviet arsenal is a burden; Bush has a good relationship with Gorbachev; the U.S. presidential election is looming; and the Soviet putsch attempt has, paradoxically, given a strong boost to the U.S. initiatives, since moderates or progressives are now determining Soviet policy.

Ptashnikov says that the Soviet response has been quick and specific.

Chernyshev replies: "In his reply, President Gorbachev agreed with Bush to a large extent—concerning radical cuts of ground and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons, the removal of strategic systems from combat duty, the halting of the development of specific types of offensive arms. In addition to eliminating all the nuclear artillery shells and nuclear warheads for the ground-launched tactical missile we are also eliminating all the nuclear mines which have long since disappeared from the U.S. arsenals. Apart from that, nuclear warheads for the air defense missiles, also absent from the U.S. arsenals, are likewise being removed from our troops. Partially these warheads will be eliminated and partially they will be concentrated at central bases.

"All tactical nuclear weapons are being removed from waterborne warships and multi-purpose submarines. These weapons, along with the nuclear weapons of the ground-based naval air force, are being stored in central storage facilities. We have made proposals to go further as far as certain things are concerned—for instance in the area of tactical weapons; not simply to store the naval tactical weapons, but to have them eliminated.

"Another addition is of great importance too: it makes it possible, as it were, to complete the whole range of all tactical nuclear weapons. I have in mind Gorbachev's proposal to remove all nuclear warheads—aviation bombs and aviation missiles—from combat units of front-line tactical air force on a reciprocal basis and to have them put in central storage facilities."

Ptashnikov asks whether Soviet security will suffer from the complete removal of tactical nuclear weapons. Chernyshev explains that these weapons are for limited nuclear wars, which the USSR believes to be impossible. In any case, the changed situation deprives them of their point. Also, they could fall into the wrong hands. The United States will remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and strike submarines. Soviet tactical aircraft cannot reach U.S. territory.

Ptashnikov asks whether the Soviet response matches the unilateral U.S. steps on strategic offensive arms. Chernyshev thinks that in the main, they do. The USSR is withdrawing more missiles from combat duty, and this is right, since "we will have to destroy more weapons". But two other Soviet moves are "frankly, hard to explain". All railway ICBMs will be kept at their permanent sites.

Chernyshev continues: "Would it not have been enough, for reciprocity, to confine ourselves to removing from combat duty the heavy bombers and a certain number of ICBMs? Why has the United States, for its part, not laid up at their bases some of their nuclear missile submarines? In practice our extra step in the placing of the permanent establishments of our mobile ICBMs renders their deployment pointless, since it substantially reduces their vulnerability to a first strike. They become, in effect, analogous to silo-based ICBMs, only more vulnerable. This is clearly at odds with the concept of strategic stability to which the Americans themselves adhere, and with the agreed aims of future Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic offensive arms. A second factor is this: Gorbachev has announced that we have decided on a more radical reduction of strategic offensive arms than envisaged by the strategic offensive arms treaties. Here, too, the question arises, whether our leadership is not in too much of a hurry. True, Gorbachev said we would welcome a similar step by the United States; but it would seem that this game of raising the stakes could fail to pay off. It's hard to believe that Washington, having for a long time defended every one of its strategic nuclear warheads so fiercely at the Geneva talks, will quickly agree to cut their number by thousands. Well, all the same, in spite of these two remarks, I would like to say that for our country's security, our extra steps play no great role.

"In order to defend oneself against and deter another country from risky actions, it is sufficient to have much less than 5,000 nuclear warheads. the nuclear stockpiles remaining at our disposal will be capable of continuing to play the role of a factory that mutually deters us from unleashing a war."

Ptashnikov asks: "You know, I notice that Gorbachev's reply to Bush ignores the U.S. President's proposal to get rid of all ICBMs with separable individually-aimed warheads. What would be your comment on that?"

Chernyshev replies: "That is not a simple issue. I would even say that it is very complicated. Of course, there's no doubt that giving up missiles with separable warheads and going over to single-block, i.e. one-warhead missiles would strengthen strategic stability. But Bush's proposal on this, in my view, is obviously one-sided. It takes no account of the difference in the structures of the missile forces of the USSR and the United States. For historical reasons, the main strike force in our strategic forces is the land-based ICBMs, while in those of the United States it is ballistic missiles on submarines. So if Bush's proposal were accepted, we would be forced to eliminate far more missiles and warheads than the Americans. But Washington doesn't want to eliminate its sea-based ballistic missiles with separable warheads. Can such a one-sided approach be considered fair? Surely not. And it is not just a question of the military strategic aspect, but mainly of the economic aspect. Not only is disarmament expensive, but we would also have to alter radically the structure of our strategic forces and rearmament forces. That is clearly not a course we can afford to take."

Ptashnikov: "Gorbachev is willing to discuss nonnuclear antimissile defense systems. Yet we have constantly protested against changing the antimissile defense treaty. Have we changed our minds?"

Chernyshev recalls that in this same studio he and Ptashnikov strongly criticized the U.S. SDI. He adds: "However, everything is changing. The military and strategic situation has changed. Relations between our countries have changed. They are now changing into partnerlike relations. "Finally, the U.S. SDI program has itself changed. It now provides for creating an ABM system with only limited goals—to defend oneself from accidentally launched missiles or against missiles that have been launched on the orders of those like Saddam Husayn. Evidently the time has indeed come to get to the bottom of this issue calmly, without superfluous emotion, to get to the bottom of it taking account of the changes that have taken place, endeavoring to be objective and without fanning up redundant emotions and having renounced the stereotypes of the cold war times. "It is always impossible to halt a logical process, first and foremost in the area of arms. In new conditions new compromises must be sought so that technical progress is not at loggerheads with the old way of thinking. The time has come to think of how to plan technological progress in the service of our countries' security. This can now be done through joint efforts. Incidentally, Gorbachev's statement contains one specific proposal on this score: to examine, together with the Americans, a possibility of setting up joint early warning systems against nuclear missile strikes, system which would comprise earth and space-based elements." Ptashnikov mentions that Gorbachev announced a unilateral one-year moratorium on nuclear tests; but Washington refuses to follow suit.

Chernyshev replies: "Yes, our president expressed the hope that thus a path would be opened toward the speediest possible and complete ban on nuclear testing. Moreover, he proposed to the United States to reach an agreement on a controlled halt to the production of all fissionable weapon-grade materials. In his view, it would facilitate the attainment of a goal he proclaimed in 1986: to rid mankind of nuclear weapons."

"Is there a hope that Washington will alter its position and accept the Soviet proposal? Not in its entirety, I think. The U.S. leadership does not see in the foreseeable future an opportunity to totally renounce nuclear weapons—more than that, it plans to improve it and test explosions are needed for that. Evidently, however, it cannot be ruled out that the United States can, in the new conditions review their negative attitude to introducing tougher curbs on nuclear tests. I thus think that it is possible to continue talks to lower the permissible limits for the yield of explosions and their annual number."

Deputy Foreign Minister on Bartholomew Discussions

LD1410133991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Oct 91

[Studio interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Aleksandrovich Obukhov by Vitaliy Kobysh; from the "International Panorama" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Kobysh] A major U.S. expert has just paid us a visit. He is Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. under secretary of state. We know that he has held consultations with the USSR on implementing the U.S. and USSR presidents' initiatives on arms reductions and destruction, primarily nuclear. Unfortunately, our media did not report on the substance of these talks, which is why we invited Aleksey Aleksandrovich Obukhov, USSR deputy foreign minister, to the studio to fill in the details of these talks. What are the principal results of these discussions?

[Obukhov] Bartholomew's arrival coincided with the announcement of the Soviet Union's counter-proposals on nuclear disarmament, set out by President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his televised speech on 5 October. This speech, and also George Bush's announcement on 27 September, predetermined the aims of Bartholomew's mission. Specific issues were examined during the consultations with the U.S. under secretary of state, to do with practical implementation of the programs promulgated by the U.S. and USSR presidents.

The first thing to note is the constructive nature of these discussions. In our delegation were authorized representatives of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia. The main political outcome of the consultations is that the parties reaffirmed their determination to press ahead with the practical implementation of the measures announced by the U.S. and USSR presidents, without any linkages or preliminary conditions whatsoever. In essence, this means that once the treaty on strategic and offensive armaments has been ratified, as intended, by the United States and USSR in the near future, the two sides will have achieved a new and extremely wide-ranging agreement on specific steps to reduce their military power and strengthen strategic stability, as well as trust.

It is also important that the supervision of the implementation of all these far-reaching measures will be carried out on the basis of an exchange of information, which does not envisage protracted negotiations on verification methods. How will this be done? The U.S. and USSR presidents' joint initiative demonstrates a new maturity in Soviet-U.S. relations, which are increasingly becoming those of partnership and mutual trust. Alongside this, the entire process of real disarmament has been given a powerful impetus: other countries are being encouraged to play an active role in the process as well. I am convinced that the very possibility of such a

major joint Soviet-American initiative arose thanks to the profound democratic changes in Soviet society, themselves made possible by the decisive victory over the right-wing conservative putsch in August.

During the consultations with Bartholomew, the Soviet side represented the sum total of the interests of our republics. The State Council approved the joint initiative on nuclear disarmament put forward by presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush when it met on 11 October. Alongside the specific proposals contained in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's announcement, of particular importance is the unilateral moratorium that we have declared on the testing of nuclear weapons. We hope that the other nuclear powers, particularly the United States, of course, will find it possible to subscribe to this and finally find a way of ending dangerous experiments with nuclear weapons in the very near future, once and for all. The recent sitting of the USSR Foreign Ministry collegium examined in detail the ministry's tasks arising from the U.S. and USSR presidents' initiatives. A number of practical steps to accelerate the disarmament dialogue in all aspects, in all fields, were outlined. There will also be new contacts with the U.S. side, and we expect that they will bring results.

World Reaction to Bush, Gorbachev Proposals Viewed

92UF0051A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 8 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by A.O. [not further identified]: "The World Says 'Yes' to M. Gorbachev's Statement. What About Us?"]

[Text] After U.S. President G. Bush presented his anti-nuclear initiative, the world public spent about a week wearily waiting for the official Soviet reaction. The first positive comments by the president's press service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs staffers have not been particularly satisfactory. Moreover, some of the Soviet and foreign press started almost to accuse the Soviet president of an allegedly "indistinct" reaction to the American initiative. Then the reaction came—M. Gorbachev's statement on Soviet television dotted all the i's. One would assume that a week-long pause between the statements of the two presidents is justified. The Soviet leader probably had to not only go over the content of his reciprocal initiative but also consult with the sovereign republics. This is also a sign of the new times.

Yesterday, the teletype brought up a multitude of reports on the reaction abroad to M. Gorbachev's statement. We will cite only two responses.

Influential American Democratic Senator Joseph Biden said that U.S. President Bush has shown new thinking by proposing to liquidate tactical nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, there is a "good deal of old thinking" left in the White House approach to the problem of strategic arms and the SDI program. Now that Moscow is displaying its readiness to agree to a substantial reduction in the

number of strategic warheads, emphasized J. Biden, "Washington can no longer wave off the discussion of radical reductions."

Georges Seguy, a leader of the French pacifist organization "The Appeal of the Hundred," which unites prominent figures in culture and science, said that "new steps taken by the Soviet Union in response to U.S. proposals in the area of reduction of its nuclear potential will lead to speedier disarmament in the entire world, to a decisive stage in this process."

Is there any need to continue, asks the leader of "The Appeal of the Hundred," spending billions of francs on the perfection of the French forces of nuclear deterrence on the basis of the hypothesis of a potential conflict between West and East? It is clear that one should decisively take the road of peace, opened by the USSR and the United States, and in particular at least stop the nuclear testing. Then Paris would have brought its statements and actions into accord with reality. Such a decision would have made a substantial contribution to the cause of detente.

It came out, from domestic rather than foreign reports, that the issues of nuclear arms reduction in the context of the latest initiatives by G. Bush and M. Gorbachev's response proposals will be discussed today at the meeting between Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Reginald Bartholomew. It is expected that additional even more radical proposals in regard to nuclear arms reductions and universal disarmament will be presented by Russia.

In what sense are all these reports on reaction to the antinuclear initiatives of the two presidents remarkable? In that they have paved the way for the escalation of similar initiatives and proposals. One would assume that, after a naturally positive reaction to the statements by G. Bush and M. Gorbachev, the world community will speak up decisively in favor of speeding up—perhaps this new term will gain currency—the disarmament race, and apply pressure in the direction of intensification of this process.

Yes, it is quite possible that Russia will speak up for more radical disarmament measures. I think that in both the United States and the other nuclear powers new proposals will be put forward in this area. The pacifist—without quotation marks—pressure on the USSR and U.S. presidents will grow. All of this is normal and is something to cheer about. In any case, for our country the slackening of the noose of military expenditures can only be cause for satisfaction. At the same time, I would like to warn against the euphoria of disarming, since it is very important to determine the margin of sufficient security for our country. Necessary and sufficient, as mathematicians say. The country is currently surrounded by difficult, to put it mildly, neighbors. That is why I would like to call on our president, who is at the

same time our supreme commander in chief, to define very precisely, and perhaps even inform all of us, where and when we should stop on the road of escalation of disarmament.

GENERAL

Discussion of Russian Republic's Nuclear Arms Role

Gorbachev-Yeltsin Agreement

LD1310193191 Berlin ADN in German
1740 GMT 13 Oct 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The Bonn daily DIE WELT reports in its Monday [14 October] edition that there has been an agreement between Soviet President Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin on a provisional arrangement that Russia should have equal and effective code-termination over all nuclear weapons:

"According to Aleksandr Rutskoy, who was Russian vice president until he was appointed prime minister of the Russian Federation last week, there is to be "a dual-key system for political dual control by the two highest political authorities on the territory of what was the USSR", as Rutskoy said in response to questions from DIE WELT on the sidelines of the second German-Soviet forum in Moscow.

Rutskoy says that all political directives of the "dual authority" will "only be issued jointly by Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin", who have been given direct authority over the newly created Central High Command of the Nuclear Forces, which controls all the nuclear weapons and nuclear armed units which previously came under separate branches of the forces.

According to Rutskoy, the Soviet General Staff has central operational control over the nuclear forces, but they are still the responsibility of the USSR Defense Ministry and the defense minister of the Russian Federation. The relevant political directives had to be given by the presidents, Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Every operational order for the use of the nuclear weapons requires, according to this explanation, agreement between the presidents of the Union and of the Russian Federation, on whose territory approximately 90 percent of all strategic nuclear systems, including the warheads, are kept.

Republics like Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, on whose territory nuclear weapons are deployed or being stored, are also included, in a not yet specified way. However, so far there are no considerations of a political veto power or of an independent technical release mechanism.

Russia would like to concentrate all nuclear weapons on the territory of the Russian Federation, in order to prevent other republics from using nuclear weapons stored on their territory as pawns for political demands.

According to Rutskoy, the physical control of all nuclear weapons is in the hands of KGB special units. For this purpose the KGB antiterror unit "Alpha" had been put under the joint authority of the two presidents.

Russia To Have Equal Say

LD1510185791 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Oct 91

[From the "Vesti" program]

[Text] Russian Vice President Rutskoy has stated that Gorbachev and Yeltsin have agreed that Russia will participate on an equal basis with the Union in the adoption of nuclear weapons decisions.

Public Opinion Poll

OW1810080291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0721 GMT 18 Oct 91

[From "Viewpoint"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the "DATA" News Agency, an opinion poll of 1,066 respondents in 14 Russian cities taken by the National Public Opinion Studies Center on October 12-13 found that 26 [percent] of them believe Soviet nuclear weapons should be under the control of either the Union president or the Union State Council.

18% said the control should be carried out by the republics where nuclear arms are stationed.

13% said the governments of all the republics of the former Soviet Union should be in charge of nuclear arms.

11% insisted that only Russia should perform the controlling function.

9% would like international organizations to oversee Soviet nuclear arsenals.

13% think nuclear weapons should be destroyed.

The rest found it difficult to answer.

Sampling error—3%.

Strategic Studies Institute Created

92UF0118A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct
Union Edition p 7

[Article by A. Portanskiy and I. Surkov: "Now We Have a Strategic Studies Institute Too"]

[Text] Several days ago the National Security and Strategic Studies Institute (INBSI) was created in Moscow with the rights of an independent nongovernmental organization. S. Blagovolin, doctor of economic sciences and head of the department of military-economic and military-political problems at the USSR Academy of Sciences' IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations], was elected its president.

One of the priority tasks of INBSI will be to formulate a conception of the country's security under fundamentally new external and internal conditions. Within the framework of this task, substantial attention will be devoted to searching for ways to carry out the conversion of military production in the country most sensibly, a problem which before our eyes is becoming one of the most acute sore spots not only of our economy but of the entire domestic situation. Judging by everything, the Institute has rather good potential to work on these priorities—among its founders are such well-known experts in the field of international and military problems as G. Kuladze, Russian deputy minister of foreign Affairs, V. Shlykov, deputy chairman of Russia's State Committee for Defense, N. Chaldymov, the president of the Army and Society Association, A. Dynkin, IMEMO deputy director, and others.

Also joining the Institute as founders are such prominent natural scientists as academicians B. Keylis-Borok and Yu. Osipyan, corresponding member of VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin] K. Skryabin, and some others. Their presence among the creators of INBSI is the result of the fact that the Institute intends to devote special attention to analyzing the impact of "gaps" in science and technology on the situation in the world and seeking ways to prevent ecological disasters (like Chernobyl) and organizing joint actions of the world community to clean up the consequences of them.

As a social organization, the Institute considers some of its main functions to be developing the best humanist traditions of Russian science, restoring and strengthening moral principles in our lives, participating in training a new generation of specialists, and, finally, carrying out charitable activities. As for the principles of work organization, the INBSI founders firmly intend to avoid creating any of the rigid, traditional structures that resemble the familiar operating scheme of absolutely everything in our country. Maximum flexibility, the ability to react quickly to any newly arising situation, is the principle of activity which is taken as the foundation.

The Institute intends to maintain ties with scientific centers and social organizations both within the country and abroad. To all appearances, at home close relations should be developed with IMEMO, the Scientific-Industrial Union, the Army and Society Association, the Foreign Policy Association, and other partners.

What seems the most important thing in the future activity of the Institute to its president?

"The most important thing is perhaps to be really independent," said S. Ye. Blagovolin, answering the question posed. "We do not want to be associated with any particular political parties, movements, or personalities. The main thing is common sense, maximum competency, and honesty. We want what is done at INBSI to have a guarantee of quality, so to speak, and be trusted both in our country and abroad."

One of the problems which we are now encountering in the country is the priority of immediate political interests over professionalism, over purposefulness, and even over the country's long-term interests. And, if we manage to resolve this problem even to a small degree, believe that everything was not undertaken in vain. We will support the development of the democratic process, the country's national renewal, and effective, purposeful domestic and foreign policy able to ensure our active and positive participation in the life of the world community. And, of course, the development of all-encompassing cooperation with the West, including in the sphere of security and military matters. Without that cooperation we will not get out of the mire into which we fell at a certain point."

Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lobov Interviewed

PM1710095191 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
17 Oct 91 p 5

[“First interview abroad,” with Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by correspondent I. Melnikov, in Vienna, on 13 October: “Is the ‘Golden Age’ of Disarmament Already Here?”]

[Text] The Austrians—I have encountered this repeatedly—have their own stereotyped perception of our Army, which they have carried with them through the postwar decades. For them it is the regiments which smashed Hitler's Wehrmacht on Austrian soil and paid in thousands of lives to take Vienna. In a word, victors.

General Lobov did not storm Vienna. He is a representative of a different generation: He put on shoulder boards only in 1954, when he began service as a private in a Third Army mountain rifle division. And yet, in the eyes of the Austrian capital Vladimir Lobov, chief of our General Staff, probably personified precisely that victorious Army.

Army General V. Lobov granted *PRAVDA* an interview two hours before his meeting with Colin Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Right after the dialogue both military chiefs flew home, leaving their General Staff colleagues in Vienna to continue the seminar on military doctrines together with representatives of the other CSCE countries.

[Melnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, almost two years have elapsed since the first Vienna seminar. Maybe it is possible to speak of the importance of the changes which have occurred in the military sphere since then in the superlative degree. It would take a good half-page just to list the steps to reduce military potentials. Let us dwell on the last stage of this process—the reciprocal initiatives of the USSR and U.S. presidents.

[Lobov] I will begin with the fact that both initiatives reflect not only the two sides' readiness to deepen the disarmament process. They signify the relationship's qualitatively new nature. They confirm that the new thinking has received recognition in the international

community. The initiatives are interesting in themselves, and they reveal a competitive element, let us say, with regard to strategic offensive arms.

[Melnikov] Undoubtedly. In respect of tactical nuclear weapons Gorbachev has not only accepted all Bush's proposals but has also gone further, toward a full third "zero." And yet, let us take a more attentive look at what you called the "competitive aspect." Previously we competed in the arms race for decades, and now what—in disarmament? How is the military itself, ours and the U.S. military, reacting to this qualitative turn? Do they agree that it is necessary to hurry here?

[Lobov] The point is this. Look attentively at Bush's initiatives—they either stem from the Soviet-U.S. agreements on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, or they have points of contact with them. Obviously, after an in-depth "domestic" analysis the U.S. side concluded that the process must be accelerated. And, really, if the treaty is going to be ratified, why drag out its execution for seven years? Otherwise there will be a tremendous waste of effort and resources—material and moral.

Further, emotions were triggered by the proposals on tactical nuclear weapons, which have always been at the sharp end of the debate. Here, moreover, far from cosmetic measures have been outlined, and even the Navy and Air Force have been affected.

Earlier I used the expression "competitive element." As the saying goes, a word once spoken cannot be unsaid... Nevertheless I wish to make myself clear: Thoughtless competition is not apparent in disarmament today; reason and balance play first fiddle. As regards our president's reply, not only was it consonant with the U.S. initiative but it also contained "spice" of its own. In short, a process is taking place: A step on our part is accompanied by a step on their part, and vice versa. The perspective is not lost sight of here. This is the point.

[Melnikov] Now let us turn to a problem which recently came to the attention of the general public. It turns out that huge sums are being swallowed up not only by the arms race but also by... the destruction of means of destruction. What is your attitude to this question?

[Lobov] It is necessary to take a most attentive attitude to the material aspect. It is no coincidence that all disarmament actions have been marked with an execution deadline for both sides. The United States, for example, has declared that it will take three years to realize its recent initiative, and it named a seven-year term for the ground forces. It is naive to think that, once a treaty has been signed, weapons can at once go "under the knife" and that is the end of the matter. The material costs are huge, and so the elimination process drags on for months and even years.

It also makes sense to think hard so that some economic benefit can be derived by destroying weapons. Some

things can be remodeled, some of the production capacities can be used for peaceful purposes—and then a kind of "ladder of compensation" is formed rung by rung.

[Melnikov] And yet it is no secret that leading military countries, in addition to reducing and eliminating arms, will continue developing new systems...

[Lobov] A reasonable point. For example, it is clear from the U.S. initiative that the United States, while reducing a number of programs, will nonetheless continue work on four which, in their view, are the most promising.

[Melnikov] Is there cooperation between Soviet and U.S. specialists, and is there an exchange of advanced technology in the destruction of weapons?

[Lobov] Alas, at present the matter has gotten no further than mutual appeals. It is time to put it on a practical footing.

[Melnikov] But what is preventing this?

[Lobov] Routine, deep-rooted habits, and a lack of interest are preventing it. However, the first steps are being taken. A U.S. deputy defense secretary is now expected to arrive in the Soviet Union precisely in connection with questions of conversion. There will be contacts—and there will be agreements on the exchange of technologies. This kind of selection process will bring to light the best option.

[Melnikov] Questions of conversion are tackled by very experienced international organizations—the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, for example. Do you welcome their "incursion" into the sphere of military-industrial complexes?

[Lobov] Do you want to know what I think? Conversion is necessary, but it must definitely lead to the development of new technologies. It is necessary to find efficient technologies right now, in the very process of eliminating weapons. And the more participants—states and international organizations—in this search, the better. All the same, the benefits will be in common.

[Melnikov] Let us return to the issues at the Vienna seminar on military doctrines. To resort to German vocabulary, is it a kind of "Paradestueck" (we would say "show"), or is the seminar really useful?

[Lobov] Useful is precisely what the seminar is. This is the second time that general staff officers from European countries, the United States, and Canada have debated national military doctrines. Looking one another in the eye, they openly share their thoughts. Confidence has appeared in their relations, and the more confidence there is, the higher is the degree of security. Colonel General Bronislav Omelichev spoke at the seminar about the main provisions of our country's future military doctrine and about the reform of the Armed Forces. The audience was very attentive—for our colleagues in the East and in the West are also on a quest. And, again, the benefits from contiguous quests are in common.

[Melnikov] We must agree that all military leaders conduct a quest. Only—let us be honest—in our country this quest is taking place in a tense situation and turbulent political processes are making their mark on it. In that connection I have the following question: Is our quest not being hampered by a number of sovereign republics' efforts to set up their own armies? In the West the example of the Ukraine is cited particularly often here...

[Lobov] This problem does indeed give the West no peace. Any conversation that I have comes back to it in one way or another. I'm asked: Won't the Union disintegrate, how will the republics behave in respect of the Armed Forces?

I understand their concern. They have gotten accustomed to our military system which also affects them. One is conscious of concern in the West's reaction...

[Melnikov] Is it justified?

[Lobov] On their part, it is, of course, justified. It stems from their lack of information about the state of affairs in the republics. That is why we are showered with worried questions from them.

If we are talking about the republics and their armed forces, there is the resolution passed by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies that speaks of the sovereignty and independence of every republic. It also says that an agreement must be concluded on collective defense with unified armed forces and unified leadership of the strategic nuclear forces. Thus, a clear, well-organized formula has been determined.

[Melnikov] You're going to be meeting with your U.S. colleague, General Powell. What questions do you want to put to him?

[Lobov] Questions are all very well, there will of course be questions. But, as I see it, we primarily need communication and contact. In many respects the foundations of world military policy rest on both our countries' armed forces. The meeting will be of mutual benefit, it will deal with the two presidents' tactical and strategic arms reduction initiatives. I am interested as to how the U.S. side sees this process further developing. There will after all still be the triad—Air Force, Navy, and missile forces. So, will we carry on extracting some elements from each component of the triad piecemeal or will we consider the triad as a whole? I am sure that the quantitative aspect, this "piecemeal approach" will not provide a true solution to the problem in the future. We must work toward the goal announced by M.S. Gorbachev back in 1986—a nuclear-free world. I will therefore ask whether the United States intends taking that road.

The second question of importance for me is nuclear weapons tests. Unlike the Americans, we have not conducted tests for a long time now and have announced a moratorium on testing next year. Their side has not as

yet taken similar or even intermediate steps. Take the problem of sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons. We suggested removing them, but the Americans are holding back. Why? What are they afraid of? The NATO bloc, whose sphere of action they are about to fundamentally expand, is still a subject for discussion.

[Melnikov] Nevertheless a process of rapprochement with the U.S. side can be discerned. How are our relations developing with our recent closest allies?

[Lobov] I would say that the attempts to develop new relations with one another are not thriving. In my view, the current stagnation is due to the fact that there have been no political decisions. Bilateral treaties should be concluded with all Eastern Europe somewhat more rapidly.

[Melnikov] Let me give a journalist's impression of the reception that the Austrians organized recently for the participants in the seminar. I noticed that the East European participants behaved in a quite friendly way toward their Soviet colleagues.

[Lobov] I too am not inclined to think that there has been any alienation. They still have too much in common with us—borders, long-standing close ties, and even Soviet weapons.

[Melnikov] One last question. How effective are our military leadership's efforts to preserve the combat capability of the Armed Forces now?

[Lobov] That's to the point! Defense Minister Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov and the General Staff consider reliably defending the Fatherland to be one of their most important tasks. We are doing everything we can to ensure that the Armed Forces are as ready as they need to be today.

The events of August have been a lesson for the Armed Forces in that they have grouped together more securely. Intensive troop combat training is under way and tasks arising in various spheres, including the economic sphere, are being tackled to a better standard. There is more discipline and one is conscious of enlisted men's and officers' mettle and sense of responsibility. There has been a growing endeavor to ensure that our Armed Forces are unified and represent the entire Soviet people [Lobov ends].

...Army Gen. Vladimir Lobov ended his interview for PRAVDA on what can be said to be that optimistic note. As he acknowledged, the interview was his first abroad.

Reaction to German Plan To Deploy Nuclear Arms

LD1610053691 Moscow TASS in English
1722 GMT 15 Oct 91

[By military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—Bundeswehr General-Inspector Klaus Naumann has announced FRG's

readiness to deploy on German territory "a small number of nuclear weapons, which could be carried also by Bundeswehr aircraft".

Interviewed by the magazine "DER SPIEGEL", Naumann expressed the view that since the Soviet Union was living through a period of changes, the outcome of which is far from clear so far, several new nuclear powers may appear on its former territory instead of one. Hence, in his opinion, Germany needs protection against any nuclear blackmail, which could be guaranteed only by arming the German air force with nuclear weapons.

In light of this, it is worth recalling that the FRG is a signatory of the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which the non-nuclear states have pledged not to accept nuclear weapons from anybody and not to assume control over them, not to produce or to obtain them by any other means. Naumann's initiative is nothing but an attempt to give Germany a chance to flagrantly violate the spirit and letter of this important international document on the ephemeral grounds that it may be breached by some republics of the former USSR.

Eager for sensations, the mass media, including Soviet means of mass information, have recently published unverified reports claiming that "some republics are establishing their control over Soviet nuclear weapons" and that they may resort to them without any sanctions from the centre. They also claim that this could now be done even by ordinary missile division commanders. Public statements by political leaders, such as Naumann's, just as recent irresponsible publications about nuclear weapons, tend to jeopardise the Non-Proliferation Treaty's regime.

In the meantime, this treaty's erosion and eventual collapse may sharply destabilise the world military-political situation. The "nuclear club's" expansion by even as little as two or three members may drastically weaken the barriers keeping in check the spread of nuclear arms.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

RSFSR Officials View ABM Cooperation With U.S.

Deputy Defense Chief: 'Very Interesting Proposal'

LD1610092691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2250 GMT 15 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Golyayev]

[Text] Rome, 16 Oct—The United States is proposing that the Soviet Union take part in the development of a nonnuclear system of antimissile defense based in space, in the air, and on the ground. The implementation of this plan would be in the interests not only of all the peoples

of the USSR, but also the world as a whole. This was stated by V. Shlykov, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Defense Committee, at an international symposium in the Italian town of Rimini organized by the Pio Mansu Center.

Despite the assurances of the central Soviet authorities about the reliability of control over nuclear weapons in the USSR, he said in an interview with the TASS correspondent, people in the West sometimes express anxiety at the true state of affairs in this area, which was particularly striking in the days following the attempted coup in Moscow. Just as we are, the West is striving to keep this threat to a minimum.

On the question of control in the USSR over nuclear weapons, I personally am basing what I say on the official statements that this control is reliable. However, judging by all accounts, V. Shlykov said, the world is not entirely satisfied with these statements. A degree of anxiety is caused, for example, by the standpoint of Ukraine and Kazakhstan which, insofar as one can judge from the press, intend to keep the nuclear bases on their territory and to have only representatives of these republics serving there.

Of course, all these issues have to be seriously assessed before any conclusions are drawn, the RSFSR representative said. This is a very serious problem which troubles not only the peoples of the USSR, but of the whole world. The Americans, for example, think that it will not in the least promote stabilization on the international scene if missiles, some of which are targeted on the United States, are to be deployed in various Soviet republics among which relations have yet to be finally determined. This is exactly why, V. Shlykov said, they are suggesting that the USSR and all the Soviet republics, regardless of which of them signs the new Union treaty, take part in developing a nonnuclear antimissile defense system. I think it is a very interesting proposal.

Defense Chief: No Discussion Yet

PM1810113291 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Oct 91 First Edition p 1

[Report on interview with Konstantin Kobets, Russian state adviser for defense, by unidentified RIA correspondent in Moscow, under "Direct Line" rubric—date of interview not stated: "General Kobets Refutes Reports"]

[Text] Moscow—Army General Konstantin Kobets, Russian state adviser for defense, described as "nonsense that no sensible person would credit" the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI report that "last week, behind the scenes in the Russian Government, the question of the possibility of an exchange of nuclear strikes between independent Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] was discussed."

"These questions have not been raised, neither at the State Committee for Defense, nor in any other Russian structure, nor at the State Council, nor at the Council of

Ministers," Gen. Kobets told a RIA correspondent. "There is no possibility even of embarking on theoretical discussions on this subject."

The state adviser also called into question the reliability of a report in London's THE INDEPENDENT newspaper, which, citing Vitaliy Shlykov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense, wrote that the United States is helping Russia to set up defenses against missiles accidentally or deliberately launched from the territory of other states.

"As an expert and a highly trained professional, no way could Shlykov have made those statements," Gen. Kobets said. "This question has not yet been raised even within the framework of Soviet-U.S. talks on creating a joint ABM defense system as part of an integrated system of collective security. The approaches to this still have to be found." He said that it can only be a question of studying questions of exchanging information on the launch, trajectory, and flight plane of a missile from a given territory.

U.S. Calls for ABM Cooperation Viewed

*LD1610184891 Moscow TASS in English
1826 GMT 16 Oct 91*

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow October 16 TASS—By far not all military specialists share the view that the realization of the American proposal for the Soviet Union to participate in the development of a space-, land- and air-based non-nuclear anti-ballistic missile defence system "will meet the interests not only of the peoples of the USSR but of the world as a whole". Even in the U.S. Congress the curtailed Strategic Defence Initiative version evokes heated debates and highlights differences.

However, there is no doubt that the U.S. President's latest arms control initiatives and the Soviet president's response to them mark the two countries' departure from their seemingly irreconcilable views on the development of the anti-ballistic missile projects.

The United States actually intends to give up its earlier version of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system to be deployed across the country and plans to permit a limited deployment of non-nuclear defence systems against limited nuclear strikes. The Soviet Union has announced its readiness "to discuss the American proposal for non-nuclear systems of anti-missile defences".

Objections against deploying a new, even if curtailed, ABM system stem primarily from the awareness of its very high cost and lack of confidence in its efficiency. Even if only one per cent of the world's present strategic potential reaches targets in the Soviet Union or the United States, this will lead to "unacceptable damage", to use a Pentagon idiom. A one-hundred percent protection against a nuclear strike is practically impossible.

Washington officials admit that if President Bush's proposals are accepted, the 1972 ABM treaty will have to be revised or amended. Amendments will most likely concern the increase in the number of areas where ABM systems may be deployed—the earlier treaty permitted the deployment of land-based ABM systems in one area only.

Any version of the ABM system will lead to the expansion of military activity to involve other spheres, including space. Moreover, it will result not in an arms race but in the unilateral growth of military potential in the United States.

Taking into account the complicated economic situation in the Soviet Union, there is no point for the country to spend colossal resources to create new ABM systems.

Many American journalists believe that the United States do not need even the curtailed ABM system in the present conditions. They say President Bush has come out with the ABM initiative seeking to pacify the conservative forces in the United States, for which the Star Wars programme has become a sacred cow, as they put it. And they may well be right in this.

The mutually acceptable solution of the ABM problem for the Soviet and American sides, it seems, should be part of a compromise involving a wide range of nuclear and non-nuclear arms in both countries.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Resistance to Pressure for Withdrawal From Baltic States

Defense Ministry Official Comments

LD1110062691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0530 GMT 11 Oct 91

[Text] The majority of republics support the idea of the preservation of a single defense zone and unified armed forces, Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, head of the USSR Ministry of Defense Information Directorate, told journalists. Representatives of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belorussia, and the republics of Central Asia have come out in favor of this.

Regarding the recent demands by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia for the fastest possible withdrawal of Soviet troops, Lt. Gen. Manilov said that they had not given rise to positive emotions in the Ministry of Defense. Soviet military leaders believe such a withdrawal cannot be initiated before the end of 1994. This timeframe is determined by the need to construct housing for the restationed units.

Ministries Against 'Speedy' Pullout

*OW1010181591 Moscow INTERFAK in English
1635 GMT 10 Oct 91*

[Report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev from "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Having contacted several highranking Soviet diplomatic and military officials DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent came to the conclusion that neither the Defence Ministry nor Foreign Ministry want the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states to be as speedy as it was in Eastern Europe. This involves not only technical difficulties which are quite natural in the movement of such number of servicemen, but also social consequences the decision to remove the troops before the end of this year might entail.

As a member of the General Staff told DP's correspondent, virtually all commanding officers believe that it's hardly necessary to place thousands of servicemen and their families, in a difficult situation with the risk of being left with no roof over their heads and no food in the coming winter for the sake of a political decision that will be taken in one way or another, the more so as they will not be the only "outcasts" forced to leave long-occupied places. They would join thousands of servicemen and their families who were removed from Czechoslovakia and Hungary too hastily, without taking into account their future accommodations, as the military circles believe.

The USSR foreign and defence ministries are expected to act during the talks to be held with envoys from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia with greater coordination in regard to the schedule of troop withdrawal and settlements for the property to be left in the cantonments. A source in the General Staff gave to understand that there is a need to correct mistakes Soviet diplomacy is believed to have committed in the process of negotiating the terms for withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe without taking into account the opinion of the Soviet military.

The spokesman for the General Staff did not concede that this is a sort of "revenge". According to him, the essence of what the military demand is to resolve this problem in "a civilized way" with no infringement on their rights and interests which lays particular responsibility on those who will lead the USSR delegations at the talks with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Considering that the talks with Vilnius will be conducted by Eduard Shevardnadze, some military officials foresee the danger of repeating the past mistakes. It's common knowledge that the decisions to remove Soviet troops from Eastern Europe were taken precisely when Eduard Shevardnadze was the USSR foreign minister, after which he was strongly criticized and had to resign.

Housing Problems Stressed

*PM1410143791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Oct 91 pp 1, 2*

[Article by military observer Vasiliy Izgarshev: "The Troops Are To Leave the Shores of the Baltic. But When and Where Will They Go?"]

[Text] There are demands from the shores of the Baltic, which only recently were called Soviet, for Soviet Army units to leave the former union republics, now independent states. And they are being made not by just anyone, but by the leaders of the countries, by statesmen.

Well, the demands cannot be described as illegitimate and unfair. But a withdrawal ultimatum too, gentlemen? Now let us see, how much time is there left before 1 December? Is it realistic to expect, say, a motorized rifle division to up and leave, board trains, and move its operations to somewhere 500-1,000 km away? And where is the division to be stationed? Where will the soldiers and the commanders live? And their families? Where will the children go to school? Where will they all go for medical treatment? Where will they get a wash?

Of course, it is the easiest thing in the world for the gentlemen who lead the Baltic republics to brush these questions aside. Nothing to do with us, they might say, we don't want to know; these are your problems, so you deal with them yourselves... But people do not behave like that in a civilized world. Indeed, is it proper to hurry in these matters?

Incidentally, I was told at the country's Defense Ministry that so far there have been no constructive talks on these matters, no agreements either. But we absolutely must have them. Our troops have a certain amount of property, buildings, and many other items of material value in those republics.

Are they to discard it all, leave it all behind, taking with them only their tents and field kitchens? And spend the winter in the Russian snows with no roof over their heads?

Now tell me who would agree to that! Let us behave reasonably, like good neighbors. Let us sit down and talk it over, as they used to say. We are bound to come to the right agreement, one taking into account the interests of all sides.

I know our side is prepared to do it. If it was prepared to recognize the Baltic countries' independence, to countenance their joining the world community, then I am sure it is perfectly possible to reach agreement on matters of mutual relations in the military sphere.

Given the desire to come to an agreement and not to confront one another nor to posture.

'Ultimatums' in CSCE Viewed

*PM1810082591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Oct 91 Union Edition p 4*

[V. Shmyganovskiy report: "They Entered Europe Through the Front Door"]

[Text] Helsinki—The leaders of the three independent states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have signed the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] Final Act. This took place in the same "Finlandia" Palace where the heads of 35 European countries, plus the United States and Canada, met in 1975. (The act now bears 41 signatures).

And so, "our" three former republics have entered the family of the peoples of the continent on an autonomous basis. Together with the others, their flags decorated the podium where the signing ceremony took place. Remember, the last time—quite recently—it was the Albanian President Ramiz Alia who mounted the podium.

A. Ruutel, A. Gorbunovs, and V. Landsbergis were welcomed by the hall not only as the leaders of newly independent countries but also as kindred spirits with great warmth toward one another. Finnish President M. Koivisto, who hosted the ceremony, noted that the Finns want to make whatever contribution they can to help achieve the aims that the Baltic countries have set themselves.

Commenting on the ceremony that was held, the press here is noting that the Baltic countries are faced with serious problems. One of these problems is the withdrawal of Soviet forces. According to assessments by Finnish experts, their contingent consists of up to 200,000 officers and men.

At a news conference all three leaders persistently expressed the idea of their immediate withdrawal from their territory and virtually called on the international community to exert pressure on the Soviet Union in this connection. Demands were made that this be done before the withdrawal of forces from Eastern European countries is completed. As is known, the Soviet Union has agreed to carry out the withdrawal by 1995, and this, according to the most sensible assessments, can be considered to be an acceptable and reasonable time-frame. As is known, the British Rhine Army, which is not numerous, intends to carry out its withdrawal from German territory over a period of seven years!

So the demand to carry out a similar operation with a more powerful contingent of troops this year cannot be considered realistic. And the world community will scarcely help here.

Another problem is posed by the ethnic minorities which in Latvia constitute almost half the population. And it was A. Gorbunovs who gave the clearest assurances that his country would give all minorities guarantees of equal rights.

...Having achieved what they wanted, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia could do their best not to quarrel with the former mother country—Russia—now that they have just entered Europe, and indeed through the front door. The period of romantic struggle must give way to a sound negotiating process—without ultimatums, unrealistic demands, and unrealizable time limits when it is a question of people's lives.

Lithuanian-Soviet Discussion of Troop Withdrawal Continues**Landsbergis Confirms Stance**

*OW1010163091 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1400 GMT 10 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The head of the Lithuanian Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis has said that the problem of the Soviet army withdrawal was high on the agenda of this visit to Britain.

Landsbergis told a news conference on October 10 that in a statement for the press the British Prime Minister John Major voiced his support.

The head of the Lithuanian parliament said that the withdrawal of the Soviet Army was not "a whim of the Lithuanian leadership, but a position of the republican parliament and all people of Lithuania". He recalled that last year 1 million 600 thousand people put their signatures to an appeal requesting the Soviet Army's pullout.

Lithuanian Vice Premier Assesses Pullout

*LD1010035491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
0000 GMT 8 Oct 91*

[Text] We will make efforts for the Soviet Army to be withdrawn from Lithuania as soon as possible, yet in reality this will be difficult to carry out. This was said to Radio Vilnius by Vice Premier Zigmantas Vaisvila.

As a member of the Lithuanian Government, Zigmantas Vaisvila is concerned with the method of the Soviet Army withdrawal. He is the one who negotiates with Soviet officials most often. I strongly doubt that the main part of the Army will be pulled out by the end of the year, said Zigmantas Vaisvila, for simple reasons. First, the Soviet Defense Ministry is trying to carry out essentially the same old policy. Though they declare good intentions they have little wish to withdraw the Army. The second reason is that both sides have to get ready for the pullout. What is meant here is the social problems of the military, property issues, our readiness to take over some functions of the Soviet military regiments, for example guarding of prisons. The first step, however, has already been made. Draft agreements of the Lithuanian and Soviet Ministries of the Interior on the withdrawal of the interior troops on the territory of Lithuania was worked out last week. The final day of the withdrawal of these troops is 1st March next year. At present the draft

is being discussed in Moscow and should be approved of by the Lithuanian and Soviet Governments in the nearest future.

In the opinion of Zigmas Vaisvila, 1st March is quite a possible term, though it may be shortened. As is known, interior troops are not part of the Soviet Army and come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Four regiments of these troops are stationed in Vilnius, Kaunas, Siauliai, and Snieckus. It is estimated that they may have up to 10,000 persons. Besides the Soviet Army and interior troops, regiments of the border guards and railway troops are stationed in Lithuania. As we have reported already, the Soviet Army stationed in Lithuania amounts to 80,000 persons. Other kinds of military regiments are considered to include about 20,000, so that the total number of the Army stationed in Lithuania numbers up to 100,000.

The Lithuanian Government has unofficial data that some Army regiments have started to be pulled out from Lithuania. No official statement, however, has yet been received from the Defense Ministry of the Soviet Union. No official agreement with the Soviets on the terms of their withdrawal has been signed either. The only concrete agreement signed concerns the handing over of the military commissariat which is to be finished by 16th October. Verbal agreements with the defense minister, Shaposhnikov, have been reached on handing over objects of civil defense and military forest areas, yet according to the vice premier, Zigmas Vaisvila, the Defense Ministry is now trying to avoid this topic. Even more, it has been recently been taking one-sided decisions which are straining the situation. For instance, Lithuanian officials received a cipher telegram which was sent to the military in Lithuania from the general headquarters in Moscow and the Baltic Military District headquarters in Riga which ordered the property and documents on the objects of civil defense and military commissariats to be urgently taken away. The Lithuanian Government has claims to this property as well, so it expressed a protest on this issue to the military leader of the Baltic District, Mironov. The latter was forced to recognize the illegal nature of these actions. After an investigation by a military commission revealed cases of theft, this property is being returned.

In the opinion of Zigmas Vaisvila, among the Soviet military leadership and maybe among the leadership of the Soviet Union there are serious disagreements on the issue of the Army in the Baltic countries. For example, commenting on the agreement on the withdrawal of the Army from the territory of Estonia signed by Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar and USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov last Friday, Vice Premier Zigmas Vaisvila it might have appeared that the minister was not authorized by the president to sign such a document. [sentence as heard] Similarly, said the Radio Vilnius interviewee, it happened some time earlier that Shaposhnikov signed an agreement with the Estonians on the handing over of the objects of civil defense. According to the data of the

Lithuanian Government, President Gorbachev was displeased by this step and warned the defense minister. All this shows that the nut will be hard to crack, said Zigmas Vaisvila.

As is known, until now military leaders have been officially mentioning a period of five to seven years in which the Army will be pulled out from the Baltic countries. The withdrawal, according to them, could start no sooner than in 1994 when the Soviet Army has been completely pulled out from Germany. These plans are totally unacceptable to Lithuania, said Zigmas Vaisvila. In his opinion it will be very good if no Army remained in Lithuania in two years. Meanwhile, it is quite possible to withdraw urgently the interior troops and first of all the [words indistinct] brigade stationed in Snieckus, the Vilnius Patrol Regiment, the [words indistinct] regiment which guards prisons. Lithuanian institutions would need more time to take over this function of the interior troops. I doubt whether we will be able to get ready for this by the new year, said Zigmas Vaisvila.

What concerns the Soviet Army, which comes under the jurisdiction of the Defense Ministry, the Lithuanian Government demands first those regiments to be withdrawn that took part in the attempted overthrows of January and August. These are two airborne divisions, each of about 10,000 persons, and the motorized infantry regiment stationed in Vilnius. It is estimated to number 5,000-7,000 persons. Because of catastrophical pollution of nature, four aviation regiments stationed in the city of Siauliai in northern Lithuania, as well as the Kaunas helicopter base stationed in the very center of the city, are demanded to be urgently disbanded.

In general four main kinds of the Soviet Army are stationed in Lithuania: airborne, land, anti-aircraft defense, and aviation regiments. It is not yet exactly known whether there are nuclear weapons in Lithuania. The defense minister of the Soviet Union, Shaposhnikov, and the commander of the anti-aircraft defense army, Ivanov, stated officially that it was no longer in Lithuania. Yet according to the Lithuanian vice premier, Zigmas Vaisvila, assurance in this may be provided only after all military objects have been inspected. By the way, last week after resolute demands from the government, Lithuanian officials were allowed to visit the first military object, a regiment stationed near Kaunas which engages in radio counterintelligence. This regiment was earlier under the jurisdiction of the Soviet KGB and now it belongs to a special communications committee of President Gorbachev.

The future pace of this conflict will be negotiated this week.

Further on 1994 Timetable

PM1010093291 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
9 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2

[V. Litovkin report: "The Baltic: Troops Will Leave, but for Prepared Positions"]

[Text] After the Baltic Council session, Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Stankevicius stated at a news conference in Vilnius that all three

Baltic states adhere to a common and unequivocal position: The presence of the Soviet Army in these countries is totally illegal.

He stressed that the presence of Soviet Armed Forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is "incompatible with these countries' independence." And all three countries, Stankevicius said, are inclined to demand that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn by 1 December this year, as the presence of a foreign army in the capitals of sovereign states "is impossible and threatening."

Commenting on these remarks, Lieutenant General Mironov, commander of the Baltic Military District, stated: "This radical approach could create another seat of confrontation. I do not think this decision can be implemented. The question of the schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet Army units must be decided at intergovernmental level."

N. Lashkevich, our correspondent in Vilnius, reports that the command of one of the troop units stationed in Lithuania has sent a letter to the Defense Ministry saying that "an order for our withdrawal, disbandment [rasformirovaniye], or reorganization without provision for social guarantees will be considered criminal. This gives us the moral right not to fulfill it."

At the USSR Defense Ministry IZVESTIYA's correspondent was told that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic region will certainly take place, but in a civilized, appropriate form, with respect for human rights being paramount. The schedule for the withdrawal will be determined when the necessary material and technical conditions have been created. As of today the situation is such that they could be withdrawn no earlier than 1994, when the withdrawal of troops from Germany and Poland is completed.

Landsbergis Repeats Call For Pullout

OW1110182091 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1630 GMT 11 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian Parliament leader Vytautas Landsbergis has said on republican radio on October 11 that Lithuania must make itself safe from "a military coup that may take place in the Soviet Union." For this reason Lithuania wants the early withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The Lithuanian Parliament leader says that his republic seeks to gain the Western countries' support for its demands for the urgent Soviet Army pullout.

Landsbergis said that a special Lithuanian delegation will be seeking such support at the Madrid conference of NATO MPs [members of parliament] on security and cooperation in Europe.

Soviet Commander Views Withdrawal Demands

PM1510154391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 12 Oct 91 p 1

[A. Khokhlov report: "Airborne Troops Frightened By the Thought of Home"]

[Text] Servicemen from the airborne troops division stationed in Kaunas have sent a letter to M. Gorbachev, B. Yeltsin, and V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, protesting the Lithuanian authorities' demand that the troops leave the republic by 1 December 1991. The airborne troops and members of their families say that there is nowhere for them to go if they leave Lithuania—there are no military camps for enlisted men on Russian territory nor housing for officers and warrant officers.

We asked Lieutenant General Ye. Podkolzin, commander of the Airborne Troops, to comment:

"The Defense Ministry is ready to withdraw troops from independent Lithuania. But we do indeed have no accommodation for personnel. At a recent Defense Ministry Collegium session USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov said that we will be able to redeploy troop units from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia no earlier than 1994, when troops from the Western Group of Forces come home and have been accommodated."

Airborne Division Writes to Landsbergis

LD1210032191 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT
11 Oct 91

[By correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius October 11 TASS—"We are reserving the right to act independently, if our opinion is not taken into account," says a letter, sent by the Soviet airborne division deployed in Kaunas to Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis.

According to the letter, officers and their families do not want to leave Lithuania for the time being. Leaders of the three Baltic republics announced at their meeting on October 5 their intention to insist on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, deployed on their territory, by December 1. Paratrooper officers believe that the withdrawal of the division is just impossible, because there is neither accommodation, nor other conditions for them in the new area of deployment.

About a week ago the Lithuanian Parliament received a similar letter, signed by non-commissioned officers and officers of the Army division, deployed almost in the centre of the Lithuanian capital. Deputy Chairman of

Lithuanian Parliament Ceslovas Stankevicius believes that this fact is one more proof of "the danger of the deployment of another country's troops" on the territory of the republic.

Moscow Blamed for Delays

*OW1210213591 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1630 GMT 12 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The press bureau of the Lithuanian Government has cited several instances where the USSR Interior Ministry failed to transfer some of its facilities to the republic as stipulated in relevant agreements.

Thus the Lithuanian Government has had a telegram from Maj.-Gen. N. Yukhno of the Soviet Army in which he says that at the moment "it is impossible to transfer the training centre of unit No. 7574 to the jurisdiction of Lithuania." In this connection Vice-Premier Zigmantas Vaisvila sent a protest telegram to USSR Interior Minister V. Barannikov.

In his telegram Mr. Vaisvila also points out that the USSR Interior Ministry has still not begun to withdraw its brigade stationed in Sneedus, although this is stipulated by an agreement of September 7. He asks Mr. Barannikov to take immediate measures to fulfil the ministry's commitments.

Yesterday USSR Deputy Interior Minister B. Yarin promised the Lithuanian vice-premier that top-ranking officials at his ministry would shortly analyse the schedule for the withdrawal of its troops from the republic and would prepare it to be signed by both states as an official agreement. Mr. Yarin said that these officials had been given powers to handle these issues by the Soviet president himself.

Commentary Cites Lithuanian Defense Minister

LD1510140291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 12 Oct 91

[Commentary by Roma Pakieniene]

[Text] The withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Lithuania and all three Baltic states is undoubtedly the most important task in the nearest future. As is known, the Baltic Council, which met in Vilnius last weekend, demanded that the Soviet Army units be pulled out as soon as possible, and from the capitals of these states by 1 December of this year.

Lithuanian National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius said in an interview with Radio Vilnius that implementation of this demand will depend on how possible it will be to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union's leaders. Audrius Butkevicius: Soviet machinery can move fast enough for them to leave by the end of the year; There are no technical problems here. There is only one problem: Is the Soviet Union going to observe its obligations?

As is known, according to the Helsinki agreement of 1990 on the reduction of armaments, which was signed by the Soviet Union, the withdrawn military units can no longer exist, even on the territory of the Soviet Union itself. They must be disbanded. Only the problem of using equipment and resettling the servicemen must be solved.

Meanwhile, according to Butkevicius, it is possible to judge from letters sent by servicemen stationed in Lithuania which arrived in Vilnius this week and from hints by the Soviet military leaders that the Soviets are not prepared to disband military units withdrawn from the Baltic area.

By the way, in his opinion, the letters from the Vilnius and Kaunas military addressed to Vytautas Landsbergis were political blackmail and yet another trick in an attempt to impose on Lithuania a rather remote date for the Army's withdrawal. "I know very well that these letters with categorical demands have been written not on the initiative of the local military. The minister of national defense said the same old Moscow style is clearly seen here.

Butkevicius further believes that both airborne divisions deployed in Kaunas and Jonava and all military units stationed in Vilnius, and the Soviet intelligence subunits, should be withdrawn from Lithuania by the end of the year. The airborne divisions have up to 20,000 people, another 10-12,000 are in the Vilnius military units.

When we speak of the army's withdrawal from the Lithuanian capital, we have in mind not only the so-called northern townlet, and this means the 8,000-strong motorized rifle division, but all 45 military objects situated here. We demand that the city is completely clean by 1 December. It is possible to do this and essential, the minister of national defense asserted. He also stated that the situation of Vilnius is in this respect better than that of Riga, where the headquarters of the Baltic military district is situated and which is virtually overcrowded with military men.

On the other hand, he said, the withdrawal of the military from the capitals means the abolition of the Baltic Military District. Therefore, it is natural that the military are very opposed to it.

If we compare the numbers of the Army in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia the largest number is in Lithuania. According to Butkevicius, there may be up to 45,000 servicemen in our country, roughly one-half of this number in Latvia and even fewer in Estonia.

Among the army units which must be withdrawn this year, Butkevicius mentioned also the intelligence sub-units. The most important of them is near Kaunas, at Linksmakalnis. This is the radio monitoring and state communication center of the KGB and the military intelligence, also called the Soviet Union's Western ears.

So far the subordination of this object in the new Union's defense system is not clear. For this reason the Soviets are delaying its disbandment.

By the way, this is the first military unit on Lithuania's territory the inspection of which started last week by Lithuania's representatives. I promise that this unit will be among the first to be withdrawn, Butkevicius said.

Apart from the abovementioned units which must be withdrawn by the end of this year, the minister of national defense also mentioned those whose withdrawal date could be negotiated. They are the antiaircraft defense, military airfields, and other objects not linked with the offensive armament.

In any case, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army, according to Butkevicius, will be a very difficult and painful process.

Asked about the promise by Soviet Defense Minister Shaposhnikov to send this week a commission which would be authorized to negotiate the dates of the Army's withdrawal, the minister of national defense stated that a commission arrived last Wednesday [9 October] from Riga. But it does not have the promised authorization and does not solve any principal issues, but only narrow departmental tasks.

This is the usual and familiar Soviet tactic, he said, to promise something and then not to keep this promise—even failing to explain such behavior.

Apart from that, Butkevicius sees a certain Soviet tactic also in a telegram by Minister Shaposhnikov sent allegedly by mistake to Vytautas Landsbergis which proposed to negotiate about the Soviet Union's defense budget and other military matters. As is known, General Shaposhnikov later apologized and explained that this had been a mistake by his subordinates and the telegram should not have reached Vilnius.

According to Butkevicius, such mistakes are not made usually, not even because of negligence by the clerks. In his opinion, they expected that the Lithuanians would maybe swallow this bait and even would come to Moscow. Then it would be possible to demonstrate to the world that Lithuania was taking part in the examination of the Soviet Union's joint defense problems. Such bait, according to the minister, has been swallowed more than once by our neighbors the Latvians and the Estonians.

I asked Minister Butkevicius about possible Western help in withdrawing the Soviet Army from the Baltic region. I do not doubt that we are going to have some Western political support, he said. But it may be more difficult to obtain material aid. One should speak here about special programs financed by Western states and concerning both Lithuania and the Soviet Union. Discussions are taking place at present, but we will receive an answer somewhat later. I think, Butkevicius said, that our interests and those of the West coincide here and they may be defended by such programs.

Latvia, Moscow Agree on Troop Pullout From Riga

Moscow Radio Report

LD1010140191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1300 GMT 10 Oct 91

[Text] USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov and Latvian Permanent Representative in Moscow Peters have met in Moscow.

Our correspondent reports from Riga that an accord was reached to the effect that the Baltic Military District Headquarters will be withdrawn from the town early next year. The military also will vacate the former buildings of the German Embassy in Latvia, and of the Latvian Society in the near future.

Riga Radio Report

LD1210082191 Riga Radio Riga Network in English 2130 GMT 10 Oct 91

[Text] After talks in Moscow with the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the official representative of the Republic of Latvia in Moscow, Mr. Janis Peters, informed that the headquarters of the Baltic Military District of the Soviet Army will be taken away from Riga at the beginning of next year.

USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov also announced that Soviet Army is due to leave several other buildings, particularly former German Embassy and Latvian Society House which the Army occupied for more than 45 years.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman: Troop Withdrawal From Poland Set

LD1010165591 Moscow TASS in English 1536 GMT 10 Oct 91

[By diplomatic correspondents Viktor Bezbrezhnyi and Viktor Runov]

[Text] Moscow, October 10 (TASS)—“The text of the Soviet-Polish treaty on the main principles of good-neighboringly relations and friendly cooperation has been preliminarily agreed,” chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today.

The treaty was discussed during working meetings in Moscow between the foreign ministers of the two countries. They also fixed the deadlines for withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland. All Soviet combat units will be withdrawn by the end of 1992, and the rest—by the end of 1993.

Churkin also touched on prospects for the Polish president's visit to the USSR. He said the problem could be discussed by Foreign Ministers Pankin and Skubiszewski when they meet to initial the treaty.

Asked about Erich Honecker's plans to settle in Chile, Churkin said the Soviet Foreign Ministry had nothing to do with this.

Churkin also said the possibility Pankin and Baker meeting before the end of October was not ruled out.

Reports on CSCE Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar

First Deputy Chief of Staff Omelichev Speaks

LD1010200491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1134 GMT 10 Oct 91

[By correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 10 October (TASS)—The seminar on military doctrines that is taking place here will exert a positive influence on the further deepening of trust and the expansion of cooperation in issues of guaranteeing stability and security in Europe. Confidence in this is heard in virtually every statement by participants in the Vienna forum, which has brought together high-ranking military representatives from 38 CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] states.

Head of the Soviet delegation Colonel General Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, who spoke today about the main guidelines for drafting the military doctrine of the renewed union of sovereign republics, has no doubts on this score, either. He noted that the extraordinarily dynamic processes of economic, political, and legal reform of society in the Soviet Union have directly affected the defense sphere as well, demanding radical revision of the principles of military structure and a change of military doctrine. This doctrine, he emphasized, has to be unified and based on a coalition—that is, it must take into account the fundamental provisions of national defense of all the republics that are to be part of the renewed union.

The Soviet general said that the doctrine of the renewed union, as an integral part of the overall scheme of national security, must represent a system of officially adopted and scientifically based views of war and how to avoid it, of military structure, and of preparation of the Union and of the unified Armed Forces to rebuff possible aggression. It must also contain views of how to conduct armed struggle to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this, war is unconditionally rejected as a means for resolving disputes between states or contradictions of an economic, political, ideological, or any other nature.

We view our security as an integral part of universal security, and we connect it with ending the arms race and with real disarmament, B. Omelichev continued. As for the political side of the doctrine, its main guide is the peace-loving political course of the state. Many of its provisions are already being implemented: Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the CSFR has been

completed in full, and the withdrawal from the territory of Germany, Poland, and Mongolia continues. Talks will begin in the near future on relocating the Soviet brigade from Cuba. Preparations are being made for bilateral talks on the status of the troops present in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and on the deadlines and procedures for their withdrawal.

Evaluating the recently announced U.S. and Soviet reciprocal initiatives as a major step in further stabilizing the military-political situation in Europe and the whole world, Omelichev said the security of the Soviet Union under the conditions of the changing military-political situation should be ensured in two main areas. The first is nuclear deterrence, which will be guaranteed by reorganized strategic nuclear forces. The second area consists of maintaining conventional armed forces at the minimum strength for ensuring the territorial integrity and independence of the country, and in the case of aggression, its repulsion.

According to the speaker's testimony, the possibility is being worked out for profound transformations and significant cuts in the of army and troop administration. As a result a reorganized Armed Forces will arise, smaller in size and number, providing a real deterrent but not creating the threat of which the USSR was often accused in the past. It is envisaged that the Armed Forces will consist of four branches: Strategic Deterrent Forces, an Air Force, a Navy, and Land Defense Troops. In Omelichev's opinion, the preservation of a single strategic nuclear force with a strictly centralized system of operative command is important, as is a reliable system of defense and security completely excluding their unsanctioned use.

We will be continuing the course toward reducing arms production and cutting the military budget. In 1991, compared with 1988, deliveries of strategic missiles will be reduced by 40 percent, of medium tanks by 66 percent, of infantry combat vehicles by 80 percent, of field artillery guns by 60 percent, and of combat aircraft by almost 50 percent. In all, allocations for procurement of arms and equipment in the current year has fallen, in comparable prices, by nearly 25 percent.

In the interests of the consolidation the security system, trust-building measures, and the development of principles of partnership, the Soviet side called on military leaders to take more radical steps in reconsidering their strategic concepts, to give up their old postulates altogether, and to move on to closer cooperation and partnership. In its view, there are several ways to lessen the probability of crises: stepwise reduction of the armed forces of the countries of the world on the basis of multinational and bilateral treaties, as well as unilateral steps; enhancement of the role of the center in averting conflicts; and the use of military capabilities under the aegis of the United Nations.

Further on Omelichev Speech

PM1110150491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[V. Nazarenko report: "Military Doctrine of the Renewed Union: Vienna Seminar Continues Work"]

[Text] Vienna, 10 Oct—The scene is Vienna's Hofburg Palace. This is the venue of the second seminar on military doctrines (the first was held at the beginning of 1990). It is being held within the framework of the talks on confidence- and security-building measures. Delegations from the 38 CSCE countries are taking part in its work. The delegations are headed by chiefs of general staffs, general inspectors, or top military leaders of equivalent rank. The forum will be working until 18 October. Its purpose is to "provide an opportunity for a discussion of military doctrines in conjunction with the building, structure, and activity of conventional forces in the zone, particularly in the light of the current and future restructuring of forces and other events in Europe and their consequences for the member states' military doctrines."

The first three days consisted of a presentation and discussion of the military doctrines and strategic concepts of the member states "against a background of their security policy in accordance with the seminar's aim." Next there will be a discussion of questions of the building and structure of the Armed Forces including their organization, means of deployment, backup systems, degree of readiness, arms procurement plans, and so forth. The remaining time will be devoted to an examination of military activity and the military training of personnel.

The main provisions of the renewed Union's future coalition military doctrine were set out by Colonel General Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. He noted that our renewed Union's doctrine must be a single coalition doctrine based on a synthesis of the principled provisions of the national security concepts of all the sovereign republics which join the renewed Union.

The new coalition doctrine is a component of the concept of national security. It must be a system of officially adopted and scientifically validated views of war and its prevention, military building, and the preparation of the sovereign republics, the country as a whole, and the single Armed Forces to repulse possible aggression, as well as the means of waging the armed struggle in these conditions. Our new doctrine will be implemented via its structurally interlinked political and military-technical aspects.

The main guideline of the political aspect will be the peace-loving course of the Union. In this respect warfare, as a means of resolving disputes between states and contradictions of an economic, political, and ideological, or any other character, is unreservedly rejected. The military-technical aspect includes questions of defense

building and the technical equipment of the Armed Forces in the new economic conditions, the choice of the forms and methods of repulsing possible aggression, and the training of troops. It brings to light the problem of the character of the military threat and determines what kind of aggression the sovereign republics and the Armed Forces of the renewed Union are trained to repulse.

We proceed today, Col. Gen. B. Omelichev said, from the basis that the threat of world nuclear and conventional wars and broad military conflicts in Europe is unlikely and has practically been reduced to a minimum. However, it would be premature to speak of the complete elimination of the military danger to the Union. The threat of localized conflicts based on territorial, interethnic, religious, and other contradictions has risen noticeably. And any localized conflict could develop into a conventional war.

The likelihood of the occurrence of crisis situations can be reduced by the phased reduction of the world community's armed forces, a consolidation of military might under UN auspices with a simultaneous reduction of all sides' armed forces to the lowest possible level, and the enhancement of the role of the Center for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts in Europe.

The reduction of troops and arms has a significant effect on the character of military relations between the states of Europe. In this context, the Soviet delegation head stressed in his speech, the implementation of new counterinitiatives by the USSR and the United States will serve the process of the further stabilization of the situation on the continent and throughout the world.

In conditions of the changed military-political situation the Union's security must be ensured in two main areas: first—the nuclear deterrent, which will be ensured by the reorganized strategic nuclear forces; and second, the maintenance of conventional armed forces at such a strength and in such a condition as would guarantee the prevention of regional conflicts and, in the event of aggression, a secure rebuff and the prevention of escalation.

The account of the main areas of the reform of the Armed Forces caught the seminar participants' special attention. This includes the transformation of the structure and leadership of the Armed Forces and the reorganization of the Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and the main and central directorates. The military-administrative division of the country will be clarified. The organizational staff structure of large strategic formations and combined and other units will change, as will the organizational strategic grouping of troops and the system of armed forces recruitment. It will be necessary to clarify military-technical policy and accelerate the solution of servicemen's social problems. The depoliticization and departyization of the Armed Forces have already been carried out.

The leadership of the single Armed Forces will have to be implemented in two vertical areas: first, the administrative (military-political), including the unified Union Defense Ministry; second, the operational (military), which will embrace the sphere of operational-strategic planning and the combat use of the Armed Forces and their management in military operations as well as the leadership of the strategic deployment of troops.

The Armed Forces will consist of four branches: the Strategic Deterrence Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Ground Defense Forces. In branches of the Armed Forces it is planned to switch from an army structure to a corps structure and from a division structure to a brigade structure, which will make it possible to streamline the management tiers and optimize the complement of those formations. The military-administrative division of the Union's territory will be based on the principles of the "republic—military district" and "troops on the territory of the republics" (for the Transcaucasus and Central Asia).

Without doubt the strategic nuclear forces will remain a single entity with a strictly centralized system of combat management which fully precludes unsanctioned use.

Col. Gen. B. Omelichev reported that we will continue the course of reducing arms production and cutting back the military budget. For example, in 1991, compared with 1988, we reduced deliveries of strategic missiles by 40 percent, medium tanks by 66 percent, infantry combat vehicles by 80 percent, field guns by 60 percent, and warplanes by 50 percent. Appropriations for the purchase of arms and hardware fell by almost 25 percent in 1991.

Great restraint is now being shown in the Armed Forces' everyday activity: The number and intensity of events connected with major exercises and maneuvers have been scaled down. In the initial stages of implementing the requirements of the military doctrine adopted in 1987, priority was given to defense. However, aggression can scarcely be successfully repulsed by means of passive actions. The experience of the Persian Gulf war confirmed that it is necessary to make broad use of the maneuverability of all branches of the Armed Forces for the purpose of routing invading enemy groupings and ending aggression.

Such, in general outline, are the main directions of the present military doctrine of the renewed Union and ways of implementing it. The account aroused great interest among seminar participants.

General Staff's Markovskiy Details Forces Cuts
*LD1610100891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1555 GMT 11 Oct 91*

[“Soviet Military Chief Discusses Structure and Make-up of USSR Armed Forces at Seminar on Military Doctrine”—TASS headline]

[Text] Vienna, 11 Oct (TASS)—Colonel-general Frants Markovskiy, first deputy head of a Main Directorate of

the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, addressed the seminar today on the make-up and structure of the Soviet Armed Forces and the principles on which recruitment will be based. Recalling the USSR president's announcement of a further reduction of 700,000 men in the strength of the Army and Navy, the speaker stressed that it will affect all branches of the Armed Forces. In accordance with the treaty on conventional Armed Forces in Europe the main types of armaments in the European USSR will be reduced by 23,427 units, including 1,461 planes, 8,508 tanks, 13,000 armored combat vehicles, and 1,843 artillery systems. Of this number of armaments being limited under the treaty, 17,499 will be scrapped and 4,425 will be converted for use in the national economy.

F. Markovskiy noted that there are plans to carry out structural changes in the Armed Forces in the near future. The aim is to ensure that the principle of defensive sufficiency becomes one of the main features of Soviet military doctrine. The main areas in which these objectives are being tackled are the unilateral reduction in the strength of the USSR Armed Forces by 500,000 servicemen, which has now been completed; the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of other countries; the scrapping of short and medium-range missiles which has been completed; the tilting of the organizational structure of combined arms divisions away from offensive and toward defensive weapons, as well as the removal of a large quantity of strike weapons from their arsenals; the elimination of mobile operational groups, the so-called "spearhead tank forces"; and the creation of a new coastal defense service in the Navy.

There are also plans to reduce the number of branches of the Armed Forces. In order to increase the reliability of control over nuclear weapons, all strategic nuclear forces and strategic defense systems will be combined in a single branch of the Armed Forces under a single operational command. There are plans to turn the ground forces into ground defense forces. The number of military districts and army directorates will be reduced and the number of combined arms divisions will be substantially cut. The Air Force and the Navy will be reformed.

According to the general, military-political structures and political organs have already been abolished in all structures of the Army and Navy, starting with the central establishment of the Ministry of Defense and ending with the lowest levels of command—battalion and company. They are being replaced with new structures for combat training, which include completely new detachments charged with military and psychological preparation. In order to increase the control exercised by various state bodies over the activities of the Armed Forces, there are plans to create a number of committees and commissions in the Ministry of Defense establishment in which representatives of the sovereign republics will participate. These will mostly be headed by and made up of civilians.

F. Markovskiy noted that a qualitative approach had been made the basis of the provision of the USSR's Armed Forces with armaments, equipment, and other material resources. In the new economic, military, and political circumstances Soviet military doctrine provides for a departure from colossal spending on purchases of armaments in large quantities. He reported that the halting of the arms race has enabled the Soviet Union to reduce these purchases by 17 billion rubles [R], while this year appropriations for the purchase of armaments have been cut by another R8.4 billion by comparison with 1990. Altogether, spending has been cut by 25 percent.

At the same time financial outlay is planned for the destruction of armaments as envisaged under international treaties. For instance, the Soviet Union will have to spend around R4.5 billion at 1990 prices on implementing concluded agreements to reduce various types of armaments up to 1995 alone. Aside from that, in connection with the transfer of a number of enterprises of the defense industries to the jurisdiction of the sovereign republics and the conversion of military production which is under way in the USSR, the proportion of civilian output produced at them will reach 65 percent by 1995 in comparison with 40-45 percent this year. It is intended to submit 422 enterprises of the defense industry and more than 100 enterprises of the nondefense industries to partial or full conversion, F. Markovskiy concluded.

Further on Markovskiy Speech

*PM1810093191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Oct 91 First Edition p 3*

[By V. Nazarenko: "Report From Seminar in Vienna: The Armed Forces of the Renewed Union"]

[Text] The seminar on military doctrines in Vienna is continuing. During the seminar Colonel General F. Markovskiy, member of the Soviet delegation, drew participants' attention to the fact that the adoption of a new (coalition) military doctrine for the renewed Union predetermines the reorganization of the Armed Forces. It is planned to bring the structure of the Armed Forces into line with the principle of defense sufficiency in the very near future. As already reported, the number of branches of the Armed Forces will be reduced. They will comprise the Strategic Deterrent Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Ground Defense Troops. At the same time the number of military districts, army directorates, and combined-arms divisions will be reduced. The effective combat strength of the Armed Forces will not exceed 3 million men.

Col. Gen. F. Markovskiy stated that motorized infantry and tank divisions, where the armored vehicle armament has been reduced and vehicles ensuring enhanced maneuverability on the battlefield and on the march excluded, have already switched to the new manning levels. Motorized infantry divisions now have 150 tanks,

637 armored vehicles, 216 artillery systems, 479 anti-tank weapons, and 269 air defense weapons. A tank division has 250 tanks, 402 armored vehicles, 210 artillery systems, and 233 air defense systems. It is planned to switch from an army-based system to one based on the corps and the brigade. It is intended that a brigade will have a total of 2,500-3,000 men, 50-60 tanks, 200-250 armored vehicles, roughly 50 cannon and mortar, and 50 air defense weapons. The number of corps and brigades in the European part of the Union will be determined so as to ensure that the levels of armaments, hardware, and personnel limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armaments in Europe are not exceeded.

It is envisaged that a number of committees and commissions will be set up in the Defense Ministry apparatus to enhance civilian monitoring of the Armed Forces' activity: for military policy and the economy, armaments orders and research and development, budget and finance, legal and social protection, civil defense, and rear services provision and construction. Representatives of sovereign republics will serve on these committees and commissions.

The switch to a professional army forms the basis of the Armed Forces' system of manpower acquisition. However, because at the present time the state is unable for economic reasons to effect a complete switchover, a mixed system of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces is deemed the most rational.

The length of compulsory service is being reduced from 24 to 18 months for soldiers, sergeants, seamen, and petty officers. The initial term of service under contract is being set at 2.5 to three years with the possibility of extending it by three, five, or 10 years.

Expenditure on the purchase of arms and hardware will be reduced significantly in the course of the military reform. Expenditure for these purposes was already reduced by 17 billion rubles [R] during 1989-1990, and by a further R8.4 billion in the current year. Compared with 1988, deliveries of strategic missiles have been reduced by 40 percent, sea-launched ballistic missiles by 54 percent, tanks by 66 percent, armored vehicles by 80 percent, artillery systems by almost 60 percent, and combat aircraft by 50 percent. This trend will be maintained in 1992.

At the same time expenditure on the destruction of arms provided for in international treaties will not be reduced. On the contrary, it might increase. For example, more than R50 million was spent on the destruction of 825 launchers and 2,268 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, while no less than R250 million at 1990 prices has to be spent on the destruction of conventional arms in accordance with the Paris Treaty. Considerable expenditure will also be required on the creation of centers for the elimination and conversion to peaceful purposes of many categories of arms, the construction of depots to store hardware, etc.

Finally, the state program for the conversion of the military industry provides for 422 defense enterprises and more than 100 enterprises in nondefense sectors to switch to producing civilian output. By 1995 the proportion of civilian output being produced will reach 65 percent as a result of reducing or ending production of military hardware in these enterprises.

These are the main areas of the reorganization of the Armed Forces of the renewed Union and the creation of the appearance of a really new army, which have been discussed in Vienna during these days.

Less Need for Large Exercises Seen

*LD1710171891 Moscow TASS in English
1605 GMT 17 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna October 17 TASS— The military activities and the training of armed forces are the subject of discussion at the current seminar here.

Practically all speakers at today's session of the seminar, which has drawn high-ranking military figures from the CSCE member-states, were unanimous that this aspect of the development of the armed forces must conform to new political realities and to the spirit of the times.

"Over recent years, the Soviet Union went to a tangible reduction in military activities on land, at sea and in the air," Colonel General Gherman Burutin, deputy chief of the main operations department of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, pointed out in a report at the seminar.

"First of all, the number of large-scale combined-arms exercises has considerably diminished. The training of troops for large-scale offensive operations or their deployment for forestalling strikes have been fully excluded from military practice.

"In prospect, the Soviet Union does not see the need for big exercises, still less for large-scale maneuvers, considering the changed military and political situation in Europe and the world", Burutin said.

Observer Comments on Troop Withdrawals From East Europe

LD1210144691 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1910 GMT 11 Oct 91

[Text] The Soviet Union is pulling out its troops from abroad stage by stage. More on this from our military affairs observer Colonel Vadim Solov'yev.

I may remind you that this past summer the return home was completed of the Soviet Army contingents from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The pullout was record fast, in less than 18 months. Our troops are now leaving Germany and Poland. The Soviet Defense Ministry has concrete plans and schedules for the withdrawal which

are strictly observed. Within less than a year more than 100,000 Soviet troops were sent home from the eastern lands of Germany. Under an agreement with that country's government the pullout will have been completed before the end of 1994. On the whole, the relations between the two sides are normal and business like.

Poland is a different matter. Soviet troops began to pull out from it beginning last April. The 50,000-strong grouping there is planned to have been fully withdrawn before the end of 1993, but these actions are on the Soviet initiative only. So far there are no accords, no legal documents about all the property, financial, and ecological aspects of the troop withdrawal. Poland would like to see the Soviet troops pulled out much sooner, disregarding the current situation in the Soviet Union when such a demand cannot be met. The main problem is housing for the withdrawing troops. Therefore, the Soviet Union intends to strictly abide by the pullout plan which was worked out at the Soviet Defense Ministry.

Simultaneously Soviet troops are leaving Mongolia. Bilateral talks are being prepared on the status of the presence of Soviet Army units in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and on the timetable and procedure for their withdrawal. The reduction of the Soviet military presence abroad is taking new, qualitative forms. It was announced a few days ago that 2,000 Soviet specialists at military radar surveillance complexes will shortly leave Cuba. Talks will begin soon to withdraw a Soviet Army brigade from Cuba. Thus security measures match the new stage in the development of international relations, based more on trust than on a threat of force.

As I see it, writes Col. Vadim Solov'yev, now that reciprocal initiatives have become possible on this basis between the U.S. and the Soviet presidents on unilateral reduction of nuclear arms by each country, the initiative may be carried on to conventional arms and to reducing the military presence outside the two countries. As is known, trust is based on reciprocity, therefore, the Soviet military have the right to count on withdrawal of U.S. troops in the short term from Europe, Asia, and, of course, from the Guantanamo base on Cuba. The United States may yet advance some other initiatives on the issue. The ball is now in its court.

U.S. Military Inspectors Visit Severodvinsk

PM1510161191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "U.S. Inspectors in Severodvinsk"]

[Text] For the first time, a team of U.S. military inspectors is working in the city of Severodvinsk, the largest defense industry center in the Soviet North, Arkhangelsk Oblast newspaper PRAVDA SEVERA [Truth of the North] reports today. It is headed by Rear Admiral John Williams, who in 1980-1981 was naval attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The team consists of 15 specialists.

Lithuanian Envoy Discusses European Arms Forum

*OW1710215191 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1630 GMT 17 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Algimantas Vaitkaitis, deputy general director of the Lithuanian Home Defense Department, has stated in Vienna that the Lithuanian armed forces will be only 1/5 of the Soviet troops stationed in the republic. Mr. Vaitkaitis spoke at the 93rd session of the Council on Security and Disarmament in Europe taking place in Vienna. The session, which will end its work on October 18, has admitted Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as members of that organization.

A Lithuanian representative said that the republic's armed forces will perform defense functions only.

The Council on Security and Disarmament in Europe has offered Lithuania help in preparation of military officers.

U.S. Seeks Information on Soviet Forces in Estonia

*OW1710214991 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2000 GMT 17 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri met with Linn Hanson, head of the American delegation for the Vienna talks on Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces in Europe on October 17 in Tallinn. According to Tiit Pruuli, a spokesman for the Estonian Foreign Ministry, Mr. Hanson spoke about the USSR's attempts to justify by all means the presence of its troops in the Baltics.

Enn Tupp, head of the Estonian parliamentary committee on defense who had attended the meeting told BF [BALTFAX] that Mr. Hanson wondered if Estonia could provide information about the Soviet forces transferred recently to the Baltics from Eastern Europe. However, the Estonian side said that it had no such information, but had the detailed data on troops permanently stationed in Estonia.

Mr. Tupp pointed out that Estonia does not plan to join NATO in the near future.

Progress on Personnel Cuts Agreement in CFE Talks

*LD1710180191 Moscow TASS in English
1712 GMT 17 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna October 17 TASS—Progress has been made here at the current talks on conventional armed

forces in Europe [CFE] in the elaboration of an agreement on personnel cuts, speakers at today's concluding full-delegation session of the present round of the talks emphasised.

Political analysts believe that the results of the work done make it possible to state that a really important stage has been traversed.

Practically all countries submitted numerical data on their armed forces and elucidated these figures. Full information of the personnel of each of the negotiating party is now available. The coinciding elements in the structures of the armed forces and the actual differences of structures have become clearer. As a result, the likely outline of a future agreement and main categories of personnel subject to cutbacks are more manifest.

"Considering the situation taking shape at the talks, we deem it timely and utterly topical to move in the near future to the elaboration of text of the agreement," Soviet Chief Delegate Oleg Grinevskiy told TASS.

"We suggest that our partners make use of the forthcoming recess and take up the preparation of texts that could be used for coordinating a final document.

"No progress is seen, unfortunately, as regards the talks' another [as received] aspect concerning getting agreement on stabilisation measures.

"Our Western partners have been for long promising to present their specific position on the issue to us but promises remain just promises. Naturally, such a state of things gives rise to serious concern," Grinevskiy said.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES**Envoy to PRC: Arms To Remain in Far East**

*OW1510152191 Tokyo KYODO in English 1454 GMT
15 Oct 91*

[Text] Beijing, Oct. 15 KYODO—Soviet Ambassador to China Nikolay Solovyev indicated Tuesday [15 October] that Soviet forces are likely to delay withdrawing surface tactical nuclear arms deployed in the Soviet Far East despite President Mikhail Gorbachev's sweeping nuclear arms cut proposal disclosed earlier this month.

Solovyev said Tuesday in an interview with KYODO News Service that the surface tactical nuclear arms will be removed from the European region first due to jurisdictional difficulties.

He said there is some uncertainty over control because nuclear arms deployed in the European region are distributed over several republics of the Soviet Union. He attributed the delay in their removal from the Far East to the domestic situation in the Soviet Union.

Solov'yev said neither China or Japan pose a threat to the Soviet Union. However, some Western observers have said the Soviets are considering maintaining a deterrent against China.

Gorbachev did not disclose detailed procedures for removal of the surface tactical nuclear arms.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Commentary Justifies Nuclear Testing Moratorium

LD1510043391 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 13 Oct 91

[Commentary by Radio Moscow military observer Sergey Kozlov—first paragraph is announcer's introduction; Kozlov speaks in Russian fading to announcer-read report in English]

[Excerpts] Today Soviet and foreign pressmen start their week-long acquaintance with the nuclear testing ground in Semipalatinsk. It is already closed. For the whole year this country will suspend nuclear testing following the declared moratorium. Our commentary is by Radio Moscow's military observer, Sergey Kozlov. [passage omitted]

Is this restraint justified from the military point of view? I am sure it is, Sergey Kozlov says, primarily because nuclear tests are expensive—every explosion costs millions of rubles. The Defense Ministry needs this money to solve the acute social problems of the Soviet servicemen who are returning from eastern Europe, and soon will return from the Baltic states.

I am sure the moratorium will not affect the country's strategic security, because the program of modernizing nuclear weapons at the age of their elimination, both in this country and in the United States, is becoming a vestige of the cold war period, a vestige which is as dangerous as it is useless. As to the existing warheads, the Soviet scientists claim they could be tested even without explosions. Militarily the Soviets' nuclear moratorium is a well-considered and necessary step.

Peace Committee Urges End to Novaya Zemlya Tests

LD1410145391 Moscow TASS in English 1308 GMT 14 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Palariya]

[Text] Moscow, October 14 (TASS)—The Russian Peace Committee and the public anti-military organisation "Novaya Zemlya-Nevada" on Monday [14 October] urged Russian President Boris Yeltsin to ban nuclear tests in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago in the Arctic Ocean.

The archipelago is the second Soviet testing site after Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. The last test in Novaya Zemlya was made on October 24, 1990.

"Our appeal to the Russian president was prompted by our concern about the health of people living in the region and the devastating effect of testing on the environment," Vladimir Burakov, first deputy head of the committee, told TASS.

He said nuclear tests account for the increased number of congenital diseases, pregnancy and labour complications in the neighbouring Arkhangelsk region of northern Russia.

"We urge the president to take measures banning nuclear testing in Novaya Zemlya as promptly as he did with the Semipalatinsk testing range. It will release 650 million roubles for cleaning the ecological aftermath in the region," Burakov said.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

U.S. Preparations To Destroy Chemical Weapons Assessed

92SV0001A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Sep 91 First edition p 3

[N. Akimov article: "First a Law Was Passed... How Preparations Are Being Made in the United States To Destroy Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] Great experience has been gained in the U.S. Armed Forces in destroying toxic agents and chemical munitions. Immediately after the end of World War II the elimination of captured chemical weapons was carried out. In subsequent years batches of their own chemical weapons that were no longer fit for use or that were obsolete were constantly being destroyed. Thus, during the period 1972 through 1986 a total of 15 major operations were carried out to destroy various kinds of formulas for toxic agents with a total weight of 6,500 tons.

During the mid-1980's certain progress was noted in international negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons. In this connection purposeful activity was initiated in the United States, and continues still, to make preparations for the large-scale destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons. In particular, in 1986 Public Law 99-145 was passed, under whose provisions the Army was assigned the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan to carry out this operation.

Taking into account the large scale of the work and the technical complexity of the task assigned, the U.S. Defense Department set up a special body headed by General D. Needham. Its mission was to select the latest technologies and analyze all possible scenarios from the standpoint of cost and actual technical feasibility within

the periods set by the law. The most important condition set here was to insure safety and protection against terrorist activity.

Three possible scenarios were analyzed: setting up a single national center to destroy chemical weapons, two regional centers, and finally, carrying out the destruction directly at the sites where toxic agents were stored. From both the standpoint of prime cost and risk to people, the idea of concentrating stocks of chemical weapons in one or two centers was rejected. It would cost almost \$300 million just for transport. It would be necessary to make 2,700 flights, or 820 convoys of motor vehicles, or 70 railroad trains.

In terms of the choice of technology for the destruction process itself, up to 300 methods were considered. Methods involving burning them in the open air, blowing up munitions at a testing ground, dispersal in the atmosphere, all methods of burial, and also burial on the sea bed, were all rejected since they failed to meet ecological requirements. The U.S. Army studied the method of chemical neutralization experimentally. Some 3,800 tons of munitions were destroyed using this method.

An evaluation was also made of the possibility of using underground nuclear explosions, but this was rejected. It is curious that it was rejected not because these kinds of explosions would not destroy the toxic agents, or that they would serve as a source of additional danger. The fact is that in the law that sanctioned the destruction of chemical weapons no mandate was given for using nuclear explosions. Moreover, problems arose connected with proving that no quantities of nondegraded toxic agents would remain after an explosion.

On the recommendation of the National Research Council the method of combustion in special furnaces was chosen as the main method for destroying the chemical weapons. At the same time the search continues for more efficient methods of destruction. Thus, a study is being conducted of the feasibility of using plasma (high-temperature) combustion of toxic agents. A study is also being conducted of the merits of the method of destroying munitions in a unit based on deep freezing using liquid nitrogen, as a result of which both the steel housing and the other elements of the munitions turn into a brittle vitreous substance and detonation of the explosive charge is eliminated. This method does not require the dismantling of the munitions or discharge of the toxic agent since it is destroyed in a press.

One typical feature of the destruction program is the very high level of the safety requirements. During transport even of munitions in perfect condition provision has been made for use of a special transport container that would eliminate all possibility of any toxic agent escaping into the atmosphere even in the event of an accident. Very low maximum permissible concentrations of toxic agents have been set both for the working

zone and outside it. These concentrations are one thousand times lower than those at which the appearance of even the very first signs of any effect on the body can be seen. The military instruments used in chemical reconnaissance to detect toxic agents at low concentrations are unsuitable for this. Therefore, especially sensitive detection methods based on chromatographs are used.

Attention is drawn to the fact that one mandatory requirement has been extensive discussion of the plan with the public. It must be subjected to examination by experts and agreed with by the Department of Health and federal agencies that deal with emergency situations and with environmental protection matters. Moreover, the plan has had to be agreed by a dozen and a half national nongovernmental societies. For example, those engaged in the protection of archaeological and historical monuments and that provide protection for wild animals.

Almost every addressee has submitted its own proposals, requests, and comments to the Department of the Army. In what was the public most interested? Data were requested on how dangerous the actual storage of toxic agents is, how they would be transported, and vulnerability to acts of terrorism. Clarifications were requested with respect to the effect on people of the toxic agents at the concentrations adopted as permissible. The question was raised of trusting the facts and conclusions presented in the document. Interest was shown in what measures had been envisaged by the Army in the event of an accident. The opinion was expressed that there was no need to agree to such rigid time tables for completion of the work under the program because that would increase costs. The Army's responses to all the issues of a technical and medical nature raised were thorough and well-argued with scientific data.

As a result a draft was drawn up according to which about 8,000 tons of toxic agents stored in 15 kinds of munitions, and also in storage facilities and on transport, are to be destroyed. Some 2,690 people will be involved in the work to destroy stocks. It is being suggested that it will cost \$2 billion to complete all the work, because the destruction of 1 kilogram of a toxic agent costs \$66.

Envoy to CD Discusses CW Committee Session

*LD1110164491 Moscow TASS in English
1535 GMT 11 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva, October 11 (TASS)—A session of the special committee for chemical weapons [CW] of the Conference on Disarmament [CD] ended in Geneva on Friday.

The session, held in a business-like atmosphere, discussed a new draft convention adopted in early September to ban chemical weapons and eliminate its stockpiles, Sergey Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation, told TASS.

Participants focused on requested inspections of suspicious sites, not declared by states. Batsanov said this is a delicate issue since it may affect commercial and technological secrets of enterprises, firms and laboratories, which have nothing to do with chemical weapons but raising certain doubts.

He said a seminar of experts on elimination of chemical weapons, which was held within the framework of the session, discussed specific aspects of this issue.

He expressed hope the session will start a series of meetings on international cooperation in eliminating chemical weapons. The draft convention will provide a legal basis for this cooperation.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

PRAVDA on Korean Nuclear-Free Zone

PM1110154891 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Oct 91 Single Edition p4

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov "Viewpoint" article: "Nuclear-Free Peninsula"]

[Text] On the one hand, this heading should be accompanied by a question mark. But, on the other hand, there should be no doubting the possibility of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Washington's recent decision to unilaterally eliminate its entire arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons was primarily addressed to Moscow. It has prompted a very special response in Pyongyang and Seoul, however, because it could resolve some very complex problems in relations between North and South Korea and thereby contribute to the reunification of this divided nation.

The situation is this: Although North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, it will only allow IAEA inspectors to visit its installations if the United States removes its nuclear potential from South Korea. But it is well known that all the U.S. warheads in that country come under the category of tactical weapons, which are now due to be scrapped.

The U.S. President's statement on the intention to unilaterally eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons stationed in other countries was immediately given a positive appraisal by Pyongyang. An official statement released by the DPRK Foreign Ministry said that, if the United States really does remove these weapons from

South Korea, this will open the way to an agreement on nuclear guarantees and make it possible to proclaim the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, which the DPRK Government has wanted for a long time.

For his part, ROK President No Tae-u has said that Washington's initiative will have an impact on the entire security system in the Korean peninsula and in North-east Asia as a whole. He has instructed his military department to draw up confidence-building measures between the two Korean states, abandon confrontation in relations between them, and create the preconditions for cooperation between North and South Korea in the United Nations in connection with their simultaneously joining this organization.

According to press reports, all U.S. nuclear facilities are stored at Kunsan Air Base, 180 km from Seoul. The total number of warheads has been reduced several times in recent years, and now approximately 100 units are left, mainly artillery shells and land mines.

There are reports that the South Korean authorities are discussing the possibility of issuing a joint Washington-Seoul declaration to the effect that there are no nuclear weapons in the south of the peninsula. They would like to time this step to coincide with President Bush's visit to the Republic of Korea, scheduled for the end of November. So there is not much time for the evacuation.

Encouraging news, in short. The preconditions now exist for radically easing the situation in the Korean peninsula, which is one of the last remaining borders of the cold war.

Ukraine Demands Nuclear Withdrawal by 1995

AU1110192991 Paris AFP in English 1857 GMT
11 Oct 91

[Text] Kiev, Soviet Ukraine, Oct 11 (AFP)—The Ukrainian parliament Friday called for the withdrawal of all nuclear forces from the republic by 1995.

At a closed-door meeting, parliament also voted for the setting up of a republican army, which should be made up of professionals come 1995.

Armed forces based in Ukraine—currently about 1.5 million men—should be reduced to about 420,000 men by 1995, at which time the republic would become "a neutral and denuclearized zone", in line with its independence declaration.

Ukraine has already appointed a defence minister, General Konstantin Morozov.

DPRK Envoy on U.S. Nuclear Withdrawal From Korea

*SK1710054691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 16 Oct 91*

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Excerpt] The DPRK Embassy in the Soviet Union held a news conference with Soviet reporters on 15 October.

Son Song-pil, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union, explained his government's stand on the U.S. President's proposal for unilateral withdrawal of nuclear weapons from U.S. military bases in the ROK.

According to the DPRK leadership, this measure will contribute to easing the situation on the Korean peninsula and to converting the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. [passage omitted]

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES**Military Forces in Kurils To Be Reduced**

*AU1410131091 Paris AFP in English 1300 GMT
14 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow, Oct 14 (AFP)—The Soviet Union announced Monday [14 October] that it would reduce its military presence on the disputed Kuril Islands by one-third starting immediately.

A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said the decision was "unilateral" and could be followed soon by further cuts in Soviet troop strength on the islands.

The spokesman, Vitaliy Churkin, said there were presently around 8,000 troops on the four islands.

FRANCE

'Adequate Level' Nuclear Arms To Be Maintained

PM1110085691 Paris *LE MONDE* in French
10 Oct 91 p 4

[Unattributed report: "France Maintains its Plan for Second Nuclear 'Component' Alongside its Submarines"]

[Text] At the seminar on military doctrines held in Vienna by the CSCE member countries on Tuesday, 8 October, French Armed Forces Chief of Staff Admiral Jacques Lanxade said that "the nuclear deterrent, at an adequate level, will continue to be the pivot of French strategy." "The submarines will still form the backbone of our deterrent," he explained, "but we must envisage the introduction by around the year 2000 of a second component, which would also be fully credible."

"We intend to maintain an adequate level," the French chief of staff added, "but we must take account of the qualitative aspects of our resources to maintain their credibility and thus enable them to be adapted to the conditions in which our deterrent is exercised."

Despite the announcement by Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev of their intention to make clear cuts in their respective strategic and tactical arsenals, these remarks show that France intends to maintain its plan to have a second nuclear component (air-to-surface missile-launching planes or surface-to-surface missiles) alongside the submarines. It also intends to continue its nuclear tests in Polynesia, which could be reduced from the present six per year to five or even four in 1992.

"The development of the situation in Europe," Admiral Lanxade said, "has led us to abandon the mobile S-45 missile and to considerably reduce the number of Hades missiles intended to replace the Pluton missiles." However, the French chief of staff gave the following clarification on the Hades program: "The 30 missiles will be stockpiled and no operational unit will be activated."

Defense Minister on UK, French Nuclear Status

LD1810081391 London BBC Television Network
in English 2130 GMT 14 Oct 91

[Interview with French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, in Paris, by presenter Jeremy Paxman in London on 14 Oct; from the "Newsnight" program—live]

[Text] [Paxman] Joining us now from Paris is the French defense minister, M. Pierre Joxe. M. Joxe, what is the French position now on a common European defense policy? Do you now support the idea of majority decisionmaking?

[Joxe] Well the first point, the new point, is that the Anglo-Italian statement recently—you've just quoted this statement—recognized the interests of defense identity for Europe, and also the long-term prospect of

defense policy. That is very important, new because some weeks ago I met, sometimes my friend and colleague Tom King, and we had already talks about that, and I even wrote papers to my European colleagues about the idea of doing something in the frame of Western European Union, and the Anglo-Italian statement is going in the direction which we believe is useful for the future.

[Paxman] Indeed, but what is the French position on how decisions will be made within it, on the question of majority decisionmaking?

[Joxe] I listened to your interview, it's the idea of qualified majority for some decisions is not on the defense policy in the whole not at all, some decisions in the operational field there will be necessary to have a majority, that is, we had an explanation with Tom King and I was with Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister, yesterday in the west of London and we talked about that, I think everything is clear now. [sentence as heard]

[Paxman] Well I'm sorry, it's not clear to me, in what operational areas would majority decisionmaking be acceptable from the French point of view.

[Joxe] I beg your pardon.

[Paxman] In what operational areas would...

[Joxe interrupting] It's not the problem of the area, it's perfectly clear that the Western European Union is acting outside the NATO area. If that is your question, it's perfectly clear—and I listened to your statement saying about NATO—there was no reference to NATO in the French and German paper, because we are all working in the frame of Atlantic alliance, we are all preparing a conference to renew the general strategy of alliance, where everybody in all the world, in Europe, in France and Great Britain, everybody's thinking about what is going to be the new strategy in the face of a new world, a new Europe, new risks.

[Paxman] Indeed, can I put one or two specific questions to you then. Are you thinking about a defense framework in which, for example, French nuclear weapons would come under European control?

[Joxe] That's another problem, very pressing problem especially for British and French people, because we are the only countries in Europe to have, in Western Europe, to have nuclear weapons, and I think that in the new field of, at least of reflection, we have to think about what in the future will be the very important relationship between France and Great Britain...

[Paxman interrupting] M. Joxe, you must have an ambition.

[Joxe] I beg your pardon.

[Paxman] You must have an ambition, M. Joxe. Do you want them to remain under French control or under European control?

[Joxe] For the moment, you know very well the French nuclear strategic weapons is an element of our national defense based on the strategy of deterrent, but the future. Who can... who knows what is the future. I've just met this morning the general chief of staff of Soviet Union, in Soviet Union they don't know yet for the moment, they don't know yet who is going to, how is going to be organized the armed forces from the union, from Russia; who can... everybody is thinking about the future, we have something new, the menace, the threat from the East to the West has diminished, but the new risks of the future we don't know them. Therefore, we have to think together, especially between British and French, what will be the necessary framework for defense of our countries, of Great Britain, of France, of Europe, of the new Europe, and of the Atlantic alliance.

[Paxman] M. Joxe, thank you very much for joining us.

GERMANY

Defense Minister Announces Military Personnel Cuts

AU1210211391 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Oct 91 p 4

[Report by "FY": "Personnel Reductions in the Bundeswehr"]

[Text] Bonn, 11 October—According to Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, 7,000 military officers and career noncommissioned officers as well as 2,300 officials of the Bundeswehr administration will have to retire prematurely, meaning before they have reached the age limit, because the Bundeswehr will be reduced to 370,000 men. That was stated by Minister Stoltenberg in the Bundestag debate on 11 October about a "law on Bundeswehr personnel" and a "law on Bundeswehr officials." He said that the personnel reductions will lead to cutbacks of 165 million German marks [DM] by 1977. Without the law on the Bundeswehr personnel, which will regulate these reductions, as of 1995, thousands of officers and noncommissioned officers would have to continue to serve in the Bundeswehr for years without adequate tasks, without promotion opportunities, and without any regard for their social interests. Stoltenberg told the deputies that three measures have been initiated to reduce the Bundeswehr: the reduction of military service to 12 months; the provision, laid down in the unification treaty, to reduce the National People's Army and to set up armed forces of 50,000 men in the new federal laender, consisting of 25,000 men doing basic military service and 25,000 temporary and regular soldiers; and drafting a deployment concept for the reduced Bundeswehr. He said that, in addition, the ministry is

holding intensive negotiations with the government and the Bundestag committees on the model for an improved personnel structure.

Defense Minister on NATO Nuclear Arms Reduction Plans

'Minimum Stock' Said 'Indispensable'

LD1510083391 Hamburg DPA in German 2330 GMT 14 Oct 91

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg has welcomed the fact that the volume of nuclear weapons in the sphere of airborne systems in Europe is also to be considerably reduced.

Speaking to the press in Bonn on Monday evening, Stoltenberg pointed out that, according to American newspaper reports, at the forthcoming session of the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina in Sicily, there is to be a decision to reduce to "well below 1,000" the 1,700 or so airborne nuclear bombs, some of them stationed in Germany and Great Britain. Nevertheless, NATO should "not take the path towards a complete denuclearization of Europe."

In Stoltenberg's view, a minimum stock of nuclear bombs is indispensable for the North Atlantic Alliance. This would counteract a nuclear threat of whatever kind. The proposals of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on a complete removal of airborne nuclear systems is not in line with the security interests of Western Europe. Stoltenberg praised the fact that U.S. President George Bush and Gorbachev intend to renounce all land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. This is in line with a stance that the FRG Government has taken for a long time.

Stoltenberg was in favor of increased security policy relations with the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union. A territorial extension of the area of the NATO treaty was not yet on the agenda, the minister stressed. The cooperation of forces in bilateral and multilateral forms should help build confidence. Stoltenberg ruled out the acceptance of the USSR into NATO for the next few years.

Further Report

AU1610100891 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 16 Oct 91 p 8

[Ruediger Moniac report: "NATO Wants To Reduce Nuclear Bombs in Europe"]

[Text] Bonn—According to German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, the "preservation of a minimum stock of air-based tactical nuclear weapons in Europe" is "indispensable." He stated this before the meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Taormina, Sicily, who will gather as the "50th Nuclear Planning Group" on 17-18 October. This ministerial conference is considered by the NATO partners as a welcome occasion—before the

alliance summit in Rome on 7 and 8 November—not only to discuss within the alliance the disarmament process for nuclear weapons initiated by U.S. President George Bush and to harmonize it, but also to coordinate “central elements” (according to Stoltenberg) of a new military strategy that the heads of state and government want to deliberate in the Italian capital. On behalf of the FRG Government, Stoltenberg welcomed Bush’s announcement to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and also the readiness of the Soviet president to basically follow suit with the U.S. efforts. At the same time, however, the German defense minister admonished that NATO continues to have a “common responsibility” and that it is necessary to “continue stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of alliance partners in Europe.”

“Minimum Stock”

The minimum stock that Stoltenberg calls necessary would consist exclusively of aircraft-based U.S. bombs with nuclear charges. According to unconfirmed U.S. reports, about 1,700 such bombs are currently being stored in U.S. depots on the territories of seven European NATO states, including Germany. In Taormina it will probably be decided to reduce this amount to “well below 1,000,” as Stoltenberg said. This would mean a stock of several hundred bombs for Germany. The Bonn defense minister stressed that it is not only his view that part of such a “minimum stock” should be accepted on German territory, but also the opinion of “the German Government,” that is, of FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Despite changed security policy conditions in Europe, such weapons continue to be necessary. The alliance must be able to counteract a “nuclear threat of any kind,” the defense minister said.

Stoltenberg Admonishes

Stoltenberg recalled that about 15 states are now able to build ballistic missiles and that the “proliferation” of nuclear weapons as well as of chemical and biological combat agents “in threshold countries and developing countries, some of which are in Europe’s neighborhood,” is progressing. In addition, despite improved relations between the West and the Soviet Union, it must not be forgotten that the Soviet Union as a whole and its individual republics have considerable nuclear potential.

Stoltenberg stressed that NATO will rely exclusively on bombs for its “air-based nuclear systems” in Europe. The development of “stand-off weapons” with acronyms such as SRAM 2 [Short-Range Attack Missile] and TASM [Tactical Anti-Ship Missile] is no longer being pursued; thus, there is “no acute need for decisions” on this issue in Taormina.

For NATO experts it is obvious that as a result of this limitation of a “minimum stock” to a bomb arsenal, the United States alone will have the capability to threaten the use of such systems if necessary. Only U.S. planes have Stealth capability, and therefore are able to deliver

nuclear charges to their targets by means of Stealth bombers with a high degree of probability against a highly armed, technologically advanced opponent.

Defense Ministry Denies Cuts in Bundeswehr Below 370,000 Men

LD1710132491 Berlin ADN in German 1229 GMT 17 Oct 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—According to a Defense Ministry spokesman, there will be no reduction of the Bundeswehr to 250,000 men by as early as 1994. He announced in Bonn today that reports to this effect are “pure inventions and without any foundation.”

The plans made by the Federal Government for 370,000 soldiers in the Bundeswehr and a national military service of 12 months are still valid. “This arrangement is unchanged and remains valid,” the spokesman said.

SWEDEN

Possible Changes in Disarmament Body Previewed

PM1610140691 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Oct 91 p 10

[Anita Kratz report: “Theorin’s Future Uncertain”]

[Text] “It would not be out of place for her to talk to me directly,” Maj Britt Theorin said. She is Sweden’s disarmament ambassador, but the question is: For how much longer?

New Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas (Moderate Coalition Party) has said publicly that Maj Britt Theorin should return to the Riksdag and retake her seat there.

Maj Britt Theorin was appointed chairman of the Disarmament Council in 1982 by the Social Democratic government. Before Theorin, Inga Thorsson and originally Alva Myrdal headed this government advisory body.

The council’s members are politicians, and the most recent composition has been three from the Social Democrats and one each from the Center Party, the Moderate Coalition Party, and the Liberal Party.

Maj Britt Theorin understands why the government may want to change chairmen.

“But I feel concern about whether there will be changes in Swedish disarmament policy. The government declaration contained nothing about disarmament policy. And where there has been disagreement—on a nuclear arms freeze, for example—it has always been the Moderates who have differed,” said Maj Britt Theorin, who will retain a post at the Foreign Ministry regardless of what happens.

She intends to pursue issues of disarmament in opposition in the Riksdag and the Foreign Affairs Committee.

In recent years civil servants in the Foreign Ministry have been worried that coveted jobs, such as ambassadorial posts, have been used as "retreat posts" for politicians.

Lennart Bodstrom, a former Social Democratic foreign minister, is ambassador in Oslo, former Liberal Party leader Ola Ullsten is ambassador in Rome, Anders Thunborg (Social Democrat) is ambassador in Washington, and Carl Lidbom (Social Democrat) is ambassador in Paris. Andreas Adahl, a former expert in the Cabinet Office Coordination Department under Thorbjorn Falldin, is ambassador in Tripoli in Libya and Karin Arland (Liberal Party) is consul general in Montreal.

In the last few days former Justice Ministry Under Secretary of State Harald Falth (Social Democrat) has taken up the post of ambassador in Manila in the Philippines after an appointment which took place with a certain degree of haste prior to the election.

Ambassadors are appointed for an unspecified period. The general practice is for them to stay three to five years in the same ambassadorial post.

The new government's appointment of Foreign Ministry civil servants Lars-Ake Nilsson as successor to Pierre Schori and Ulf Dinkelspiel as Europe minister has calmed the fears of Foreign Ministry personnel. Thus far at least, according to a source to whom SVENSKA DAGBLADET has spoken, there is every indication that the nonsocialist government appreciates diplomatic competence more than political merits.

TURKEY

Chief of Staff: Agree With USSR on Tactical Nuclear Arms

TA1010111391 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1000 GMT 10 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow (A.A)—Chief of General Staff Dogan Gures, currently in Moscow on a four-day official visit as the guest of his Soviet counterpart Vladimir Lobov, said here on Thursday that Turkey and the Soviet Union share the same point of view concerning the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons.

Gen. Gures told reporters that Turkey, as a neighbouring country to the Soviet Union, gives great importance to the initiative undertaken by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev concerning the reduction of nuclear arms and shares the same opinion with the Soviet Union on the reduction and dismantling of nuclear tactical weapons.

Soviet Envoy Voices Concern Over Nuclear Weapons

TA1010152391 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1455 GMT 10 Oct 91

[Text] Ankara (A.A)—"The existence of nuclear weapons in Turkey is a cause for concern for Soviets" the Soviet ambassador in Ankara said here on Thursday.

In an exclusive interview with (A.A) Ambassador Albert Chernyshev said removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey will contribute to the friendship ties between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

"Existence of nuclear weapons in my country must be a cause for concern for you too," Chernyshev said and added: "The aim of both the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union is to remove concern from the world. All countries, including Turkey, must look upon the issue from this standpoint. Destruction of nuclear weapons and measures to be taken in connection with tactical weapons in particular, will no doubt increase Turkey's security," he said.

Chernyshev said there was no reason for a debate about whether or not nuclear weapons should be removed from Turkey in view of Turkey's geopolitical and geographical importance.

If they are allowed to remain in Turkey, this may lead to claims to have nuclear weapons by other countries, which may handicap destruction of these weapons, he pointed out, and said the issue of nuclear weapons in Iraq will soon be resolved and necessary measures in this respect will be taken.

UNITED KINGDOM

Bush Arms Cuts Supported, Trident Unaffected

92WC0006A London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 28 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by George Jones: "Britain To Keep Trident"]

[Text] Mr. Major gave his full backing last night for President Bush's far-reaching disarmament initiative while emphasising that Britain would retain a minimum nuclear deterrent, including Trident.

Mr. Bush discussed his proposals with the prime minister during a 15-minute telephone call at lunchtime yesterday.

It was the culmination of a series of top-secret discussions between the president and the prime minister on the new attempt to achieve deep cuts in American and Soviet nuclear arms and to ensure those that remained were kept under the tightest control.

While Downing Street refused to make any official comment until after the president had delivered his address to the nation, it was acknowledged in Whitehall

that Mr. Bush's radical plans to seek the reduction and eventual elimination of all multiple-warhead nuclear weapons could be a significant step towards a safer world.

During their telephone conversation, Mr. Major is understood to have told the president that the new opportunity to achieve much lower levels of nuclear weapons stocks by the two superpowers could be a turning point for the world.

British officials stressed that there was no immediate threat to the new Trident submarine, which is to replace

the ageing Polaris force by the mid-1990s. Each submarine will carry 16 missiles, each with eight warheads supplied by the United States and ministers said that plans to order a fourth submarine would go ahead.

While fully supporting what are regarded as imaginative and bold steps to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, Mr. Major believes that Britain must retain its nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.

He is understood to have told the president that he regards adequate conventional and nuclear weapons as the bedrock of British and European security, and intends to ensure that both are retained by this country.